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Summary
The Navy in February 2006 proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including, among other things, 11 aircraft carriers, 48 attack submarines
(SSNs), 88 cruisers and destroyers, 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 31 amphibious
ships, and a Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron with 12
new-construction amphibious and sealift-type ships.  In conjunction with this
proposed 313-ship fleet, the Navy submitted a 5-year (FY2007-FY2011) shipbuilding
plan as part of the FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and a 30-
year (FY2007-FY2036) shipbuilding plan that the Navy is required by law to submit
each year. 
Whether the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) supports the Navy’s
proposed 313-ship fleet is uncertain.  The final report on the 2005 Quadrennial
Defense Review supported a fleet of more than 281 ships, including 11 carriers, but
did not explicitly endorse a 313-ship fleet including the numbers that the Navy has
outlined for other types of ships.
Within the 313-ship proposal, some observers have questioned the Navy’s
planned figures for aircraft carriers, SSNs, and amphibious ships, and have suggested
that a fleet with 12 carriers, 55 or more SSNs, and 35 or 36 amphibious ships would
be more appropriate.
The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough ships to fully
support all elements of the 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run.  Deficiencies
in the shipbuilding plan relative to the 313-ship fleet include 1 amphibious ship, 4
cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), 12 SSNs, and (when calculated on a 35-year
basis) 26 cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy says that for its shipbuilding plans to be affordable and executable,
the Navy needs to control certain non-shipbuilding expenditures and build ships
within estimated costs.  Some observers have questioned the Navy’s ability to do
these things.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that shipbuilding costs will
be about 34% higher than the Navy estimates.  If the Navy cannot meet its goals
regarding non-shipbuilding expenditures and shipbuilding costs, the Navy’s
shipbuilding plans may become difficult or impossible to execute, particularly after
FY2011.
The Navy’s shipbuilding plans raise potential issues regarding the shipbuilding
industrial base, particularly in the areas of the submarine design and engineering
base, and the surface combatant construction base.
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-504 of June
16, 2006) on H.R. 5631, expressed concern for the Navy’s ability to execute its
shipbuilding plans, particularly in light of recent cost growth in Navy shipbuilding
programs.  This report will be updated when events warrant.
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Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction and Issue for Congress
The Navy in February 2006 proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including, among other things, 11 aircraft carriers, 48 attack submarines
(SSNs), 88 cruisers and destroyers, 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 31 amphibious
ships, and a Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron with 12
new-construction amphibious and sealift-type ships.1  In conjunction with this
proposed 313-ship fleet, the Navy submitted a 5-year (FY2007-FY2011) shipbuilding
plan as part of the FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and a 30-
year (FY2007-FY2036) shipbuilding plan that the Navy is required by law to submit
each year. 
The Navy’s 313-ship proposal is intended to end a period of ambiguity and
uncertainty in Navy ship force structure planning that began three years earlier, in
February 2003, if not earlier.  This ambiguity, together with year-to-year volatility in
the composition of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, created difficulties for Congress in
conducting oversight of Navy budgets and programs, and for industry in making
rational business-planning decisions.  Ambiguity in Navy force-structure planning
may also have created difficulties for the Navy in defending its requirements in
discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  For details on this
previous period of ambiguity, see Appendix A.  Navy officials have stated that they
hope to avoid substantial year-to-year changes in the composition of the associated
five- or six-year Navy shipbuilding plan. 
The issue for Congress is how to respond to the Navy’s 313-ship proposal and
associated shipbuilding plans.  Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force
structure and shipbuilding programs could significantly affect future U.S. military
capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the Navy shipbuilding industrial base.
CRS-2
2 Section 216 is an amended version of a provision (Section 217) in the House-reported
version of H.R. 1588.  See H.Rept. 108-354, pp. 28-29, 612-613 and H.Rept. 108-106, pp.
255-256.
3 U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Strategic Plan In Support of Program Objective
Memorandum 08, May 2006, p. 11.
Background
Navy’s Proposed 313-Ship Fleet
What types of ships are included in the 313-ship proposal, and how does
this proposal compare to previous Navy ship force structure proposals?
Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy’s 313-ship proposal and compares
it to other recent Navy force structure proposals.  The 313-ship proposal can be
viewed as roughly consistent with other recent Navy ship force-structure proposals.
Independent Studies On Navy Force Structure
What independent studies are available concerning potential future Navy
ship force structures?
Section 216 of the conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003)
on the FY2004 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24,
2003) required the Secretary of Defense to provide for two independently performed
studies on potential future fleet platform architectures (i.e., potential force structure
plans) for the Navy.  The two studies, which were conducted by the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force Transformation (OFT, a part of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense), were submitted to the congressional defense committees
in February 2005.2
A third independent study on potential future fleet platform architectures, which
was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) on
its own initiative, was made available to congressional and other audiences in March
2005.  Appendix B summarizes these three studies.
Navy Plans For A “Future Force Mix Analysis”
The Navy anticipates conducting a “future force mix analysis” that could result
in a new Navy ship force structure plan to replace the 313-ship proposal.  A May
2006 Navy planning document states that the
Navy will continue to refine capability and capacity requirements in POM-08
[the Program Objective Memorandum for the FY2008 budget] by reviewing the
force mix against emerging and evolving threats. [The] Navy will conduct an
analytic review and analysis of potential alternative capacity and capability
mixes that will support Joint Force requirements and enable stable shipbuilding
and procurement accounts.3
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submarines (SSBNs) 14 14 14 14 14
Cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs)
4 4 4 4 2 or 4b
Attack submarines
(SSNs) 48 37 41 55 55
Aircraft carriers 11 10 11 12 12
Cruisers, destroyers,
frigates
88 67 92 104 116
Littoral Combat
Ships (LCSs) 55 63 82 56 0
Amphibious ships 31 17 24 37 36
MPF(F) shipsc 12c 14c 20c 0c 0c
Combat logistics
(resupply) ships
30 24 26 42 34
Dedicated mine
warfare ships 0 0 0 26
d 16
Othere 20 10 11 25 25
Total battle force
ships 313 260 325 375 310 or 312
Sources:  2001 QDR report, U.S. Navy data, and Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2007.
a.  Initial composition.  Composition was subsequently modified.
b.  The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs.  The Administration’s
proposed FY2001 DOD budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available
Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs.  Congress, in
marking up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs.
c.  Today’s 16 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine
Corps operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy
battle force ships.  The Navy’s planned MPF (Future) ships, however, may be capable of
contributing to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations).
For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted here as battle force ships.
d.  The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced
mobilization status called Mobilization Category B.  Ships in this status are not readily
deployable and thus do not count as battle force ships.  The 375-ship proposal thus implied
transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness status.
e.  Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.
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Navy Shipbuilding Plans
What ships are proposed for procurement in the Navy’s shipbuilding
plans?
FY2007-FY2011 Shipbuilding Plan.  Table 2 shows the Navy’s FY2007-
FY2011 ship-procurement plan.
Table 2.  Navy FY2007-FY2011 Ship-Procurement Plan
(Ships fully funded in FY2006 shown for reference)





SSN-774 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
DDG-1000 2a 0a 1 1 1 5
CG(X) 1 1
LCS 3b 2 3 6 6 6 23
LPD-17 1 1 1
LHA(R) 1 1 2
TAKE 1 1 1 2
LHA(R)-MPF(F) 1 1
TAKE-MPF(F) 1 1 1 3
LMSR-MPF(F) 1 1 2
MLP-MPF(F) 1 1 2
JHSV 1 1 1 3




3 5 4 5 6 8 28
Sources:  Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2007 Budget, Chart
15 (p. 5-3), and Draft Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for FY 2007.
Key:  CVN-21 = CVN-21 class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.  SSN-774 = Virginia (SSN-774)
class nuclear-powered attack submarine.  DDG-1000 = DDG-1000 (formerly DD[X]) class destroyer.
CG(X) = CG(X) class cruiser.  LCS = Littoral Combat Ship.  LPD-17 = San Antonio (LPD-17) class
amphibious ship.  LHA(R) = LHA(R) class amphibious assault ship.  TAKE =Lewis and Clark
(TAKE-1) class resupply ship.  LHA(R)-MPF(F) = Modified LHA(R) intended for MPF(F)
squadron.  TAKE-MPF(F) = Modified TAKE intended for MPF(F) squadron.  LMSR-MPF(F) =
Modified large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) sealift ship intended for MPF(F) squadron.
MLP-MPF(F) = Mobile Landing Platform ship intended for MPF(F) squadron.  JHSV = Joint High-
Speed Vessel for use as an intratheater connector (i.e., transport) ship.
a. Each of the two DDG-1000s to be procured in FY2007 is to be split-funded (i.e., incrementally
funded) across FY2007 and FY2008.
b. Includes one LCS funded through the Navy’s research and development account and two LCSs
funded through the Shipbuilding and Procurement, Navy (SCN) account.
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30-Year (FY2007-FY2036) Shipbuilding Plan.  Table 3 below shows the
Navy’s 30-year (FY2007-FY2036) ship-procurement plan.














































07 2* 2 1 1 1   7
08 1 0* 3 1 1 1   7
09 1 6 1 2 1 11
10 1 6 1 1 2 1 12
11 2 6 1 4 1 14
12 1 1 6 2 2 1 13
13 2 5 2 1 2 12
14 1 6 2 2 11
15 2 6 2 1 11
16 1 1 5 2 1 10
17 2 2   4
18 2 2 1 1   6
19 2 2   4
20 2 2 1   5
21 1 2 2 1 2 1   9
22 2 2 1 1 2 2 10
23 2 2 1 1 2 3 11
24 2 2 1 2 2 2 11
25 1 2 2 1 1 3 10
26 2 2 1 1 3 1 10
27 2 2 1 2 2 1 10
28 2 2 1 2 1   8
29 1 2 1 1 1 1   7
30 2 1 2 1 2 2 10
31 2 3 1 1 1   8
32 2 2 2 1 1   8
33 2 3 1 1 1   8
34 1 2 6 2 1 12
35 2 6 1 1 10
36 2 6 2 1 11
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2007.
* Two ships, each to be split-funded (i.e., incrementally funded ) across FY2007 and FY2008.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and
destroyers); LCS = Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile
submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; EWS = expeditionary warfare (i.e., amphibious)
ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MIW = mine warfare ships; MPF(F) =
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
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4 Dave Ahearn, “Rumsfeld On Increasing Fleet Size: Capabilities, Not Numbers, Count,”
Defense Today, December 16, 2005.
5 DOD transcript of press conference.
6 U.S. Department of Defense.  Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  Washington, 2006.
(February 6, 2006)  p. 48.
7 The report mentions specific force-structure goals for Army brigades (page 43), Army end
strength (page 43), Marine Corps end strength (page 43), special force battalions (page 44;
these are to be increased by one-third); psychological operations and civil affairs units
(page45; these are to be increased by 3,500 personnel); the Air Force B-52 bomber force
(page 46); Air Force combat wings (page 47);  Air Force Minuteman III ballistic missiles
(page 50); and Air Force inter-theater airlift aircraft (page 54).
8  The report also states that based on a series of analyses, DOD
concluded that the size of today’s forces — both the Active and Reserve
Components across all four Military Departments — is appropriate to meet
current and projected operational demands. At the same time, these analyses
highlighted the need to continue re-balancing the mix of joint capabilities and
forces.
(Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op cit, p. 41.)
Regarding the reference to “today’s forces,” the Navy, as mentioned earlier, included a total
of 281 ships as of early-February 2006.
The QDR report also states that
policy decisions, such as mobilization policies and war aims, may change over
time and have implications for the shape and size of U.S. forces. Finally, as part
(continued...)
Oversight Issues for Congress
OSD Support For 313-Ship Proposal
Does the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) support the 313-ship
proposal?  If not, where would that leave Navy ship force-structure
planning?
When asked about the Navy’s 313-ship proposal in December 2005, Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly replied that it is Navy capabilities, not
numbers of ships, that count.4  When asked about the Navy’s 313-ship proposal at a
January 25, 2006, press conference, Secretary Rumsfeld declined to explicitly
endorse the plan.5
The final report on DOD’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released
on February 3, 2006, states that DOD will “Build a larger fleet that includes 11
Carrier Strike Groups....”6  The Navy as of early-February 2006 included 281 ships.
The report specifically mentions force-structure goals for several parts of DOD,7 but
does not mention the Navy’s 313-ship proposal or force-level goals for any ships
other than aircraft carriers.8
CRS-7
8 (...continued)
of a process of continuous reassessment and improvement, this wartime construct
will be further developed over time to differentiate among the Military
Departments as to how they should best size and shape their unique force
structures, for use by the Combatant Commanders, since all parts of the construct
do not apply equally to all capability portfolios.
(Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op cit, pp. 38-39.)
9 CRS Report RL32731, Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS John F.
Kennedy — Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
10 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.  See also CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
Secretary Rumsfeld’s reported response in December 2005, his statements at the
January 25, 2006, press conference, and the final report on the QDR together suggest
that OSD supports a Navy with 11 carrier strike groups and more than the early-
February 2006 total of 281 ships, but not necessarily the Navy’s proposed 313-ship
fleet, including the Navy’s proposed subtotals for ship types other than aircraft
carriers.
Appropriateness Of 313-Ship Proposal
Does the 313-ship proposal include appropriate numbers of ships?
Number of Aircraft Carriers.  Some observers have questioned whether  the
Navy’s proposed total of 11 aircraft carriers will be sufficient, particularly in light of
past Navy plans that have called for 12 carriers.  These observers have argued that
if the carrier force is reduced in the near term to 11 ships through the proposed
retirement of the carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67), then it will fall further, to 10
ships, during the two-year period 2013-2014.  Even if an 11-carrier force is adequate,
they argue, a 10-carrier force might not be, even if only for a two-year period.  These
observers also note that the Navy plans to increase the carrier force back to 12 ships
in 2019 and maintain it at that level thereafter.  This, they argue, suggests that the
Navy would actually prefer to have 12 carriers in coming years, rather than 11.  The
issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.9
Number of Attack Submarines.  Some observers have questioned whether
the Navy’s proposed total of 48 attack submarines will be sufficient, and have
suggested that a total of 55 or more would be more appropriate, particularly in light
of requests for forward-deployed attack submarines from U.S. regional military
commanders, and the modernization of China’s naval forces, including its
submarines.  The issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.10
Number of Amphibious Ships.  Some observers have questioned whether
the Navy’s proposed total of 31 amphibious ships will be sufficient, and have
suggested that a total of 35 or 36 would be more appropriate, since a total of 35
would be better able to meet the Marine Corps’ requirement for having 30
operationally available amphibious ships (i.e., ships not in overhaul) at any one time,
CRS-8
11 CRS Report RL32513, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning
Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
12 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated
that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987.  This figure, however, is
the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of
battle force ships.  The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy.  In recent years, the total number of active ships has
been larger than the total number of battle force ships.  For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships,
while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle
force ships.  Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of
battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case
overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy.  As a general rule
to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy
over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
13 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
and since the Marine Corps has testified in recent years that a force of 36 ships would
be needed for the amphibious force to fully meet a fiscally constrained goal of being
able to lift the assault echelons of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).  The
issue is discussed in more detail in another CRS report.11
Total Number of Ships.
Historical Fleet Size and Previous Force Plans.  One possible method
for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being proposed by the
Navy is to compare that number to historical figures for total fleet size.  Historical
figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the
appropriateness of the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical
figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the
Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available
to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time.
The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships
at the end of FY1987,12 and as of May 22, 2005 had declined to a total of 282 battle
force ships.  The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission
requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential
multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the February 2006 fleet is intended
to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing
events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential
regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations.  In
addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the February 2006 fleet in
areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of
Tomahawk-capable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.13
In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible
example, a greater emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime
CRS-9
14 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
15 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era
600-ship plan of the 1980s, the  Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the
final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the
Clinton Administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base
Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR.  The table
below summarizes some key features of these plans.
(continued...)
military capabilities.14  In addition, the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have
changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive
implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned
vehicles.
The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing
its stated missions; the 281-ship fleet of February 2006 may or nor may not be
capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain
number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions.  Given
changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however,
these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another.
For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are
not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet’s ability to
perform its stated missions.  An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not
necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing,
because the fleet’s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship
numbers and average ship capability.  Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the
fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet’s ability to perform stated missions is
decreasing, because the fleet’s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly
than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time
that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than
offset reductions in total ship numbers.
Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might
provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure
plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships
for performing missions, and other force-planning factors suggest that some caution
should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if
those past force structure plans are more than a few years old.  The Reagan-era plan
for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions
focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis
for planning the Navy today.15
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Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans
Plan 600-ship Base Force 1993 BUR 1997 QDR
Total ships ~600 ~450/416a 346 ~305/310b
Attack submarines 100 80/~55c 45-55 50/55d
Aircraft carriers 15f 12 11+1g 11+1g
Surface combatants 242/228h ~150 ~124 116
Amphibious ships ~75i 51j 36j 36j
Source:  Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data.
a.  Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of
FY1999.
b.  Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number
of attack submarines to 55 from 50.
c.  Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55.
d.  Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55.
e.  Plus two or four additional converted Trident cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) for the
2001 QDR plan and four additional SSGNs for the 375-ship proposal.
f.  Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP).
g. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.
h. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228.
i.  Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus
one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).
j.  Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs.  Note how number needed to meet
this goal changed from Base Force plan to the BUR plan — a result of new, larger
amphibious ship designs.
Current Force-Planning Issues.  Current force-planning issues that
Congress may consider in assessing the appropriateness of the Navy’s 313-ship
proposal include the following:
! naval requirements for the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and for
irregular conflicts such as insurgencies;
! naval requirements for countering improved Chinese maritime
military forces;
! new technologies that may affect U.S. Navy ship capabilities;
! additional forward homeporting and the Sea Swap concept;
! DOD’s increased emphasis on achieving full jointness in U.S.
military plans and operations; and
! potential tradeoffs between funding Navy requirements and funding
competing defense requirements.
Each of these is discussed briefly below.
Global War on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.  The potential effects
of the GWOT and irregular conflicts such as insurgencies on requirements for U.S.
ground forces have received much attention in recent months.  The potential effects
of these factors on requirements for U.S. naval forces has received somewhat less
attention.  In terms of ships, possible effects on requirements for U.S. naval forces
include an increased emphasis on one or more of the following:
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! ships (such as attack submarines, surface combatants, or aircraft
carriers) that can conduct offshore surveillance of suspected
terrorists and irregular military forces using either built-in sensors or
embarked unmanned vehicles;
! ships (such as surface combatants, particularly smaller ones like the
LCS) and smaller surface craft for conducting coastal patrol and
intercept operations, including countering small boats and craft and
countering pirate-like operations;16
! ships (such as attack submarines) for covertly inserting and
recovering Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs;17
! ships (such as amphibious ships) for supporting smaller-scale
Marine Corps operations ashore; and
! ships (such as aircraft carriers or large-deck amphibious assault
ships) that can launch strike-fighters armed with smaller-scale
precision guided weapons.
Although the primary stated missions of the LCS relate to defeating littoral anti-
access forces of opposing countries rather than to countering terrorists, some
observers view the inclusion of 55 LCSs in the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet as
evidence that the proposal is aimed in part at meeting operational demands associated
with the Navy’s role in the GWOT.  Supporters of the Navy’s planned MPF(F)
squadron argue that this squadron could be valuable in sea-based counter-terrorist
operations.  In addition, the Navy in recent months has taken some actions that reflect
a stated specific interest in increasing the Navy’s role in the GWOT.  Among these
are the establishment of a Navy riverine force that is to consist of three squadrons of
12 boats each, and a total of about 700 personnel.  These boats, as small craft, are not
included in the Navy’s proposed total of 313 ships.18
Chinese Maritime Military Forces.  China’s naval modernization has
potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for
a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military
influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile
submarines.  Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium
on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating
China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment
that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons.
CRS-12
19 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
20 For additional discussion of Sea Swap, see CRS Report RS21338, Navy Ship
Deployments: New Approaches — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
China’s naval modernization raises potential issues concerning the size of the
Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in
the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable
platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and
EMP hardening of Navy systems.  Aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers, and
attack submarines are viewed by some observers as ships that might be particularly
appropriate for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces.19
New Technologies.  New technologies that will likely affect the capabilities
of Navy ships in coming years, and consequently the number of ships that may be
needed to perform a given set of missions, include improved radars and other sensors
(including miniaturized sensors); improved computers and networking systems;
unmanned vehicles; reduced-size, precision-guided, air-delivered weapons;
electromagnetic rail guns; directed-energy weapons (such as lasers); and integrated
electric-drive propulsion technology, to name just a few.  Historically, the effect of
improving technology historically has often been to increase the capability of
individual Navy ships and thereby permit a reduction in the number of Navy ships
needed to perform a stated set of missions. However, some analysts believe that
networking technology and reduced-sized sensors may argue in favor of a more
distributed force structure that includes a larger number of smaller ships such as the
LCS.
Forward Homeporting and Sea Swap.  The Navy is considering
transferring an aircraft carrier from the continental United States to either Hawaii or
Guam and increasing the number of attack submarines homeported at Hawaii or
Guam.  The Navy has also experimented with the concept of deploying a Navy ship
for an extended period of time (e.g., 12, 18, or 24 months, rather than the traditional
deployment period of 6 months) and rotating successive crews out the ship every 6
months — a concept the Navy calls Sea Swap.  Other things held equal, homeporting
additional Navy ships in forward locations such as Guam and Hawaii, and applying
the Sea Swap concept to a significant portion of the fleet, could reduce, perhaps
substantially, the total number of Navy ships needed to maintain a certain number of
Navy ships in overseas operating areas on a day-to-day basis.  For some types of
ships, additional forward homeporting and use of Sea Swap might reduce the number
of ships needed for maintaining day-to-day forward deployments below the number
needed for fighting conflicts.  In such cases, fully implementing the force-level
economies suggested by forward homeporting and Sea Swap could leave the Navy
with inadequate forces for fighting conflicts.20 
Jointness.  DOD’s increased emphasis on achieving increased jointness (i.e.,
coordination and integration of the military services) in U.S. military plans and
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operations could lead to reassessments of requirements for Navy capabilities that
were originally determined in a less-joint setting.  Areas where U.S. Navy capabilities
overlap with the those of the Air Force or Army, and where total U.S. capabilities
across the services exceed DOD requirements, might be viewed as candidates for
such reassessments, while capabilities that are unique to the Navy might be viewed
as less suitable for such reassessments.  An example of a broad area shared by the
Navy, Air Force, and Army is tactical aviation, while an example of an area that is
usually regarded as unique to the Navy is antisubmarine warfare.
Competing Defense Priorities.  A final issue to consider are the funding
needs of other defense programs.  In a situation of finite defense resources, funding
certain Navy requirements may require not funding certain other defense priorities.
If so, then the issue could become how to allocate finite resources so as to limit
operational risk over the various missions involving both Navy and non-Navy
mission requirements.
Adequacy Of Shipbuilding Plans For Maintaining 313 Ships
Do the Navy’s shipbuilding plans adequately support the 313-ship proposal?
Navy Projection Of Future Force Levels.  Table 4 shows the Navy’s
projection of future force levels that would result from implementing the Navy’s 30-
year shipbuilding plan.
Total Number And Mix Of Ships.  As can be seen in Table 4, the Navy
projects that the fleet would increase to 315 ships in FY2012, peak at 330 ships in
FY2017-FY2018, and then decline to less than 313 ships in FY2026 and subsequent
years, reaching a minimum of 293 ships in FY2034.
The FY2012 fleet of 315 ships would not match the mix of ships called for in
the Navy’s 313-ship proposal.  For example, the fleet in FY2012 would include 21
LCSs rather than 55, and 2 new-construction MPF(F) ships rather than 12.  The fleet
would draw closer to the mix in the 313-ship proposal in subsequent years, as the
LCS, MPF(F), and other shipbuilding programs continued, and as older ships
currently in the force retired from service.
Numbers Of Selected Ship Types.
Summary.  Insufficiencies in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan relative to
force-level goals for specific ship types in the proposed 313-ship fleet include one
LPD-17, four SSGNs, eight SSNs, 26 cruisers and destroyers (when calculated on a
35-year basis), and the timing of some of the replacement SSBNs.  Below are
discussions by individual ship type.
Aircraft Carriers.  As mentioned earlier, the Navy projects that the carrier
force will drop to 10 ships in FY2013-FY2014 due to a gap between the retirement
of the Enterprise (CVN-65) and the commissioning of CVN-78 (the first of the
planned CVN-21 class carriers).  The Navy projects that it will maintain a force of
12 carriers starting in FY2019, when CVN-79 is commissioned.  The Navy could
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keep the carrier force at 11 ships in FY2019 and subsequent years by accelerating the
retirement of an existing carrier.
Table 4.  Navy Projection Of Future Force Levels
(resulting from implementation of 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3)
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07 11 105   1 52 4 14 34 32 14   0 18 285
08 11 108   4 53 4 14 33 35 14   0 18 294
09 11 110   6 54 4 14 33 35 14   0 18 299
10 11 112   9 53 4 14 33 33 14   0 18 301
11 11 113 15 53 4 14 33 30 14   0 19 306
12 11 112 21 54 4 14 33 30 14   2 20 315
13 10 106 27 55 4 14 32 30 14   4 21 317
14 10   99 33 53 4 14 32 30 14   7 19 315
15 11   93 38 52 4 14 31 30 14 10 17 314
16 11   91 44 50 4 14 31 30 14 11 17 317
17 11   92 50 50 4 14 31 30 13 11 18 324
18 11   93 55 48 4 14 31 30 12 12 20 330
19 12   93 55 48 4 14 31 30 10 12 21 330
20 12   94 55 47 4 14 30 30   8 12 21 327
21 12   95 55 47 4 14 30 30   6 12 21 326
22 12   93 55 47 4 14 30 30   5 12 21 323
23 12   93 55 46 4 14 30 30   2 12 22 320
24 12   93 55 45 4 14 30 30   1 12 23 319
25 12   92 55 44 4 14 30 30   0 12 21 314
26 12   89 55 43 4 14 30 30   0 12 22 311
27 12   88 55 42 2 14 30 30   0 12 22 307
28 12   87 55 40 1 14 30 30   0 12 22 303
29 12   85 55 40 0 13 30 30   0 12 22 299
30 12   82 55 41 0 12 30 30   0 12 22 296
31 12   79 55 42 0 11 30 30   0 12 21 292
32 12   77 55 44 0 12 30 30   0 12 22 294
33 12   75 55 46 0 13 30 30   0 12 21 294
34 12   73 55 48 0 12 30 30   0 12 21 293
35 12   73 55 49 0 12 30 30   0 12 21 294
36 12   73 55 51 0 12 30 30   0 12 21 296
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2007.
Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; SC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and
destroyers); LCS = Littoral Combat Ships; SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile
submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; EWS = expeditionary warfare (i.e., amphibious)
ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MIW = mine warfare ships; MPF(F) =
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs).  The 313-ship plan calls for a total
of  14 SSBNs, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 14 replacement
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SSBNs procured at a rate of one per year during the period FY2022-FY2035.  The
14 replacement ships, however, are not procured on a schedule that would permit a
timely one-for-one replacement for some of the 14 existing SSBNs.  As a result, the
Navy projects that the SSBN force will drop to 12 ships in the 2030s, with a dip to
11 during the year 2031.  The force would build back up to 14 ships as the final
replacement SSBNs enter service around 2040.  Accelerating the procurement of
some of the SSBNs to earlier years would permit the SSBN force to remain at a
steady level of 14 ships while existing ships were replaced by new ones.
Converted Trident Submarines (SSGNs).  Although the 313-ship plan
calls for a total of four SSGNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan includes no
replacements for the four current SSGNs, which the Navy projects will reach
retirement age and leave service in FY2027-FY2029.
Attack Submarines (SSNs).  Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of
48 SSNs, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough SSNs to maintain
a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run.  The Navy projects that the SSN
force will drop below 48 boats in 2020, reach a minimum of 40 boats (17% less than
the required figure of 48) in 2028 and 2029, and remain below 48 boats through
2033.  Maintaining a force of 48 boats consistently over the long run would require
adding eight SSNs into the 30-year shipbuilding plan by FY2022.
Cruisers And Destroyers.  Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of
88 cruisers and destroyers, the 30-year shipbuilding plan does not include enough
cruisers and destroyers to maintain a force of 88 ships consistently over the long run.
CRS projects that the cruiser-destroyer force will drop below 88 ships in 2027, reach
a minimum of 62 ships (30% less than the required figure of 88) in 2044-2046, and
increase to a long-term plateau of 70 ships (20% less than 88) in the 2050s.  The
shortfall in cruisers and destroyers will account for much of the shortfall in the
overall size of the fleet, relative to the goal of 313 ships, in the 2030s and beyond.
To maintain a force of 88 cruisers and destroyers over the long run could require
adding 26 cruisers and destroyers to the long-term shipbuilding plan by FY2039.
Amphibious Ships.  Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total of 10 LPD-
17s, the FY2007-FY2011 shipbuilding plan ends procurement of LPD-17s after the
procurement of a ninth ship in FY2008.  Although the 313-ship plan calls for a total
of 31 amphibious ships, the Navy projects that the force will drop to 30 ships in
2020.
Affordability And Executibility of Shipbuilding Plans
Are the Navy’s shipbuilding plans affordable and executable?
The Navy says that for its shipbuilding plans to be affordable and executable,
four things need to happen:
! Navy Operation and Maintenance (O&M) spending needs to remain
flat in real terms (i.e., not grow in inflation-adjusted terms);
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Costs of the Navy’s 2006 Shipbuilding Plan, [Testimony] before the Subcommittee on
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! Navy Military Personnel (MilPer) spending needs to remain flat in
real terms;
! Navy research and development (R&D) spending needs to decrease
from current levels and remain at the decreased level over the long
run; and
! Navy ships need to be built at the Navy’s currently estimated prices.
The Navy says the first three things are needed for the Navy to be able to
increase the shipbuilding budget from an average in recent years of about $10.5
billion per year in constant FY2007 dollars to a long-term average of about $14.4
billion per year in constant FY2007 dollars — an increase of about 37% in real
terms.21
Some observers have questioned whether all four of the above things will
happen, arguing the following:
! DOD in the past has not been fully successful in meeting its goals
for controlling O&M costs.
! The Navy does not have full control over its MilPer costs — they
can be affected, for example, by decisions that Congress makes on
pay and benefits.
! While Navy may be able to decrease R&D spending in coming years
as a number of new systems shift from development to procurement,
it may be difficult for the Navy to keep R&D spending at that
reduced level over the long run, because the Navy at some point will
likely want to start development of other new systems.
! Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant
cost growth in recent years, and CBO estimates that Navy ships will
cost substantially more to build than the Navy estimates.
Regarding the last point, CBO estimates, as shown in Table 5, that the Navy’s
shipbuilding plan could cost an average of about $19.5 billion per year in constant
FY2007 dollars to execute — about 35% more than the Navy estimates.  If aircraft
carrier refueling overhauls are also included in the calculation, CBO’s estimated cost
($20.6 billion per year in constant FY2007 dollars) is about 33% higher than the
Navy’s estimate ($15.5 billion in constant FY2007 dollars).  The table also shows
that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan is augmented to include the extra ships needed
to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run (see discussion
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in previous section), CBO estimates the average annual cost at $21.9 billion per year
excluding carrier refueling overhauls, and $22.9 billion per year including carrier
refueling overhauls, both figures in constant FY2007 dollars.
Table 5.  Average Annual Shipbuilding Costs







Navy shipbuilding budget in recent years 10.5 11.7
Navy estimate of cost of 30-year plan 14.4 15.5
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan 19.5 20.6
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan plus
additional ships needed to fully support all
elements of 313-ship fleet consistently over
the long run
21.7 22.9
Source: CBO telephone conversation with CRS, May 31, 2006.  See also Statement of J. Michael
Gilmore, Assistant Director, and Eric J. Labs, Principal Analyst, [On] Potential Costs of the Navy’s
2006 Shipbuilding Plan, [Testimony] before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces Committee on
Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, March 30, 2006.
If one or more of the four required things listed above does not happen, it might
become difficult or impossible to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans.  The risk
of the plan becoming unexecutable may become particularly acute after FY2011,
when the Navy plans to increase annual procurement from 1 destroyer and 1
submarine per year to more than 1 cruiser and destroyer and 2 submarines per year.
Adequacy Of Shipbuilding Plans For Industrial Base
Do the Navy’s shipbuilding plans adequately support the shipbuilding
industrial base?
Total Number of Ships Per Year.  As shown in Table 3, under the Navy’s
30-year shipbuilding plan, procurement would increase to 10 to 14 ships per year in
FY2009-FY2016, decrease to 4 to 6 ships per year in FY2017-FY2020, and then
increase again to 10 or 11 ships per year starting in FY2022.  This pattern could put
the shipbuilding industry through a production roller coaster that could reduce
shipbuilding efficiencies and, other things held equal, increase shipbuilding costs.
Larger Ships.  Although the total number of ships to be procured under the
Navy’s FY2007-FY2011 shipbuilding plan increases from 7 ships per year in
FY2007 and FY2008 to 11 ships in FY2009, 12 ships in FY2010, and 14 ships in
FY2011, much of this increase is due the planned increase in the number of LCSs
procured each year.  When the LCSs are set aside, the total number of larger ships to
be procured grows from five in FY2007 to eight in FY2011.
As shown in Table 2, the Navy’s FY2007-FY2011 plan includes a total of 28
larger ships (i.e., ships other than LCSs), or an average of about 5.6 larger ships per
year.  This average rate, if implemented, would be similar to rate of procurement that
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has been maintained for larger ships since the early 1990s (see Appendix C).
Consequently, for the six yards that build the Navy’s larger ships, the Navy’s
FY2007-FY2011 shipbuilding plan would, if implemented, result in a continuation,
more or less, of the relatively low workloads and employment levels these yards have
experienced in recent years.
Aircraft Carriers.  The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for procuring
one carrier every four of five years, starting with CVN-78 in FY2008.  In terms of the
shipyard’s ability to efficiently shift production from one carrier to the next, a four-
year interval might be preferable than a five-year interval (and a three-year interval
might be even more preferable).  None of the intervals in the Navy’s 30-year plan are
as long as the planned seven-year interval between CVN-77 (procured in FY2001)
and CVN-78 (to be procured in FY2008).
Submarines.
Submarine Construction.  For the two submarine shipbuilders — General
Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) and Northrop Grumman Newport News
(NGNN) — the Navy’s plan to continue procuring one Virginia-class SSN per year
through FY2011 would maintain Virginia-class submarine construction work at
levels about the same as those in recent years.
The Navy is planning to increase the SSN procurement rate from the current one
ship per year to two ships per year starting in FY2012.  The submarine industrial base
could execute an increase to two ships per year by an earlier date, although the
construction times for the additional boat or boats procured might be somewhat
longer than usual.  The Navy has expressed misgivings about accelerating the start
of two per year prior to FY2012, in large part because the additional funding that
would be required in the years in question could force reductions in other Navy
programs in those years.
Submarine Design And Engineering.  Navy and industry officials are
concerned about the future of the submarine design and engineering base, which
currently faces the prospect, for the first time in about 50 years, of not having a new
submarine design project on which to work.  Since many of the design and
engineering skills needed for submarines are not exercised fully, or at all, through the
design of surface ships, attempting to maintain the submarine design and engineering
base by giving it surface-ship design work is viewed by Navy and industry officials
as a risky approach.  This view has been reinforced by the recent experience of the
United Kingdom, which attempted unsuccessfully to maintain its submarine design
and engineering base by giving it surface-ship design work. The UK later
experienced substantial difficulties in its subsequent Astute-class SSN design and
engineering effort.  These difficulties were substantial enough that employees from
GD/EB’s design and engineering staff were used to help overcome problems in the
Astute-class effort.
Options for additional work for the submarine design and engineering base over
the next few years include the following:
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23 An additional issue that some observers believe might be behind Navy resistance to the
idea of designing and building diesel-electric submarines in the United States for sale to
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! Expanded Virginia-class modification effort.  The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target.  The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications.  An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
! New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).  The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land.  DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production.  Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production.  This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
! Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan.  In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric
submarines.22  Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose.  This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas.  Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base.  Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them.  Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged.  This project might raise concerns regarding the
potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S. submarine
technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in the past for
not supporting the idea of designing and building diesel-electric
submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.23
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foreign buyers, but which these observers believe the Navy is unwilling to state publicly, is
a purported fear among Navy officials that the establishment of a U.S. production line for
such boats would lead to political pressure for the Navy to accept the procurement of such
boats for its own use, perhaps in lieu of nuclear-powered submarines.  The Navy argues that
non-nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for U.S. submarine operations, which
typically involve long, stealthy transits to the operating area, long submerged periods in the
operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.
! New SSN design.  Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years.  The Navy estimates that the
cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to the procurement
cost of three SSNs.   The House version of the FY2006 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea, but the idea was
not supported by the Navy, in large part because of its cost, and the
conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
! Accelerated start of next SSBN design.  Given the ages of the
Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a replacement SSBN design
would normally not need to start until FY2012-FY2014.  The start
of this project, however, could be accelerated to FY2007.  The
project would then be carried out as a steady-state effort over several
years, rather than as a more-concentrated effort starting in FY2012-
FY2014.  This option could provide a significant amount of
submarine design and engineering work for several years, and could
engage all submarine design and engineering skills.  The total cost
of this effort would be comparable to that of the previous option of
designing a new SSN, but this option would accelerate a cost that the
Navy already plans to incur, whereas the option for designing a new
SSN would be an additional cost.
The Navy has stated that it is aware of the need to devise a strategy to preserve
the submarine design and engineering base, and that it has asked the RAND
Corporation to study the issue and report back to the Navy later this year.  Some
supporters of the submarine design and engineering base are concerned that elements
of the design and engineering base might atrophy below critical minimum levels
during the time that the Navy is waiting to learn the results of the RAND study.
Cruisers and Destroyers.  The 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for procuring
an average of about 1.5 DDG-1000s/CG(X)s over the next 17 years.  The light-ship
displacement of the DDG-1000 (about 12,435 tons) is about 79% greater than that
of the DDG-51 Flight IIA design (about 6,950 tons).  If shipyard construction work
for these two ship classes is roughly proportional to their light-ship displacements,
and if the CG(X) is about the same size as the DDG-1000, then procuring an average
of 1.5 DDG-1000s/CG(X)s per year might provide an amount of shipyard work
equivalent to procuring about 2.7 DDG-51s per year.  Splitting this work evenly
between the two yards that build larger surface combatants — General Dynamics’s
Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula,
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24 See, for example, CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, April 1994, pp. 59-62 (out of print,
available from author).
25 GD/BIW is also the prime contractor for the GD version of the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS), but the GD version is to be built by the Austal USA shipyard, of Mobile, AL.
MS, that forms parts of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS) — might thus
provide each yard with the work equivalent of about 1.35 DDG-51s per year.
Supporters of these two yards argued in the 1990s that a total of 3 DDG-51s per
year (i.e., an average of 1.5 DDG-51s per year for each yard), in conjunction with
other work being performed at the two yards (particularly Ingalls), was the minimum
rate needed to maintain the financial health of the two yards.24  Navy officials in
recent years have questioned whether this figure is still valid.  Building the
equivalent of about 2.7 DDG-51s per year equates to about 90% of this rate.
If GD/BIW were to build the second and fourth DDG-1000s, then the rather
lengthy interval between GD/BIW’s first ship (to be procured in FY2007) and its
second ship (to be procured in FY2010) could reduce GD/BIW’s ability to efficiently
shift production from one ship to the next.
If affordability considerations limit DDG-1000/CG(X) procurement to one ship
per year in FY2011 and subsequent years, the workload for the cruiser-destroyer
industrial base in those years would be reduced substantially from levels that would
be achieved under the Navy’s 30-year plan.  Procuring one DDG-1000/CG(X) per
year might provide an amount of shipyard work equivalent to procuring about 1.8
DDG-51s per year, and splitting this work evenly between GD/BIW and Ingalls
might provide each yard with the work equivalent of about 0.9 DDG-51s per year,
which would be equivalent to 60% of the rate cited in the 1990s by supporters of the
two shipyards as the minimum needed to maintain the financial health of the two
yards.
If the Navy at some point holds a competition between the two yards for the
right to build the third and subsequent DDG-1000s, the yard that loses the
competition could face a difficult business situation, particularly if that yard is
GD/BIW which is involved as a shipbuilder in no shipbuilding programs other than
the DDG-51 and DDG-1000.25  Consequently, if GD/BIW does not build DDG-1000s
and does not receive other new ship-construction work, then GD/BIW could
experience a significant reduction in workloads, revenues, and employment levels by
the end of the decade.  Theoretical scenarios for the yard under such circumstances
could include closure and liquidation of the yard, the “mothballing” of the yard or
some portion of it, or reorienting the yard into one that focuses on other kinds of
work, such as building commercial ships, overhauling and modernizing Navy or
commercial ships, or fabricating components of Navy or commercial ships that are
being built by other yards.  Reorienting the yard into one that focuses on other kinds
of work, if feasible, could arguably result in workloads, revenues, and employment
levels that were significantly reduced from current levels.
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If Ingalls were to lose such a competition and other work being done at Ingalls
(particularly construction of amphibious ships) does not increase, then Ingalls could
similarly experience a reduction in workloads, revenues, and employment levels.
The continuation of amphibious-ship construction at Ingalls could make the scenarios
of closure and liquidation or mothballing less likely for Ingalls than for GD/BIW, but
workloads, revenues, and employment levels could still be reduced from current
levels, and the cost of amphibious-ship construction and other work done at Ingalls
(such as construction of new Coast Guard cutters) could increase due to reduced
spreading of shipyard fixed overhead costs.
Littoral Combat Ships.  The Navy’s plan to increase LCS procurement to a
maximum sustained rate of six ships per year starting in FY2009 would, if
implemented, provide a substantial and continuing amount of work for the firms
involved in this program.  The two LCSs that the Navy has requested for FY2007
represent a decline from the three LCSs funded in FY2006, and would, if
implemented, put these firms through a bit of a roller coaster by reducing the LCS
workload in FY2007 before increasing it again in FY2008 to a projected level of
three ships.  Such a roller coaster might introduce some inefficiency into the LCS
production effort.
The Navy has included two additional LCSs on its FY2007 unfunded
requirements list (URL) — its “wish list” list of items that are desired but not
included in the budget.  Funding one of these two ships along with the two ships in
the FY2007 budget would maintain last year’s funded production level of three ships,
while funding both of the ships in the URL would continue to increase LCS
production toward the planned sustained rate of six ships per year.  The Navy,
however, projects that it will request funds for three ships in FY2008, so increasing
the FY2007 production total to three or four ships might set the stage for putting the
firms through a roller coaster unless production in FY2008 were increased to four or
five ships.  A production level of three or four ships in FY2007 and four or five ships
in FY2008 could ease the transition to the planned production level of six ships in
FY2009.
Amphibious Ships.
Large-Deck Amphibious Assault Ships.  The Navy’s FY2007-FY2011
shipbuilding plan and 30-year shipbuilding plan show a total of four LHA
(Replacement), or LHA(R), large-deck amphibious assault ships, including variants
built for the Navy’s MPF(F) force, being procured in FY2007, FY2010, FY2011, and
FY2013, followed by no further procurement of large-deck amphibious assault ships
until the start of a projected class called the LHD(X) in FY2026.  The procurement
of four LHA(R)s in the seven-year period FY2007-FY2013 would provide a
substantial amount of work to NGSS, the expected builder of these ships, and to
other firms that would provide materials or components for the ships.  The uneven
spacing of the four LHA(R)s within the seven-year period might reduce some
production efficiencies in the building of these ships.  The lengthy interval between
the last of these four LHA(R)s and the start of procurement in FY2026 of a future
large-deck amphibious ships called LHD(X) could pose a challenge to any elements
of the shipbuilding industrial base that are unique to, or heavily dependent on,
production of large-deck amphibious assault ships.
CRS-23
LPD-17 Class Ships.  The decision in the FY2007 budget to defer
procurement of the ninth LPD-17 by one year, to FY2008, reflected in part a Navy
concern about the potential ability of NGSS, following Hurricane Katrina, to support
the construction of this ship if it were procured in FY2007.  The Navy, however,
states that the FY2007 advance procurement funding requested for this ship is
sufficient to support the amount of work that would have occurred in FY2007 had the
ship been fully funded in FY2007.  Accelerating the procurement of this ship back
to FY2007 is an item on the Navy’s FY2007 URL.
Auxiliary And Sealift Ships.  The Navy’s plan to procure a squadron of
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships will provide additional
work to NGSS in the form of additional large-deck amphibious ships (discussed
above), and additional work to General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding
Company (GD/NASSCO) in the form of three additional TAKE-1 class ships.  The
MPF(F) squadron will also include three new-construction Large, Medium-speed,
Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) sealift ships and three new-construction Mobile Logistic
Platform (MLP) ships.  GD and Northrop could compete for the LMSRs, and both
these firms and potentially others could compete for the MLPs.  Since the builders
of the LMSRs and MLPs have not been determined, the industrial-base impact of the
MPF(F) plan is partly unclear.
FY2007 Legislative Activity
FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5122/S. 2766)
House.  Section 121 of H.R. 5122 would amend 10 USC 5062 to require that
the Navy include not less than 48 operational attack submarines.  Section 332 would
require a report on the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan.  Section 333 would require a
report on the Navy’s surface ship rotational crewing programs.  The House Armed
Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-452 of May 5, 2006) on H.R. 5122,
states:
The committee applauds the Chief of Naval Operations for developing the
Navy’s future force structure and the accompanying long-term shipbuilding plan
to build it.  This long-term plan provides the shipbuilding industry a view into the
future that has been lacking.  However, the committee is concerned that the plan
was developed using unrealistic assumptions that will not make the plan
executable.  Of greatest concern to the committee is the affordability of the ship
construction plan.  According to the Navy’s estimates, execution of this plan
requires a significant increase in shipbuilding funds from $8.7 billion in fiscal
year 2006 to $17.2 billion in fiscal year 2011.  Obtaining these additional funds
in a period of anticipated federal spending reductions will be difficult.  The plan
also assumes that individual ship acquisition programs can avoid the cost growth
that has plagued most Navy ship acquisition programs.
The committee is concerned about the affordability of the Navy’s long-term
shipbuilding plan, recreating much of the uncertainty about the future of naval
shipbuilding that the plan was designed to eliminate.  (Page 67)
The report also states:
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The committee is concerned by the Chief of Naval Operation’s plan to
retire the USS John F. Kennedy.  According to the Navy’s long range
shipbuilding plan, if the Navy retires the Kennedy, then the aircraft carrier force
will drop to 11 between now and 2012, and then drop to 10 in 2013 and 2014.
With the commissioning of CVN-78 in 2015, the aircraft carrier force increases
to 11 and then back to 12 in 2019 and beyond.
The committee believes it is the objective of the Chief of Naval Operations
to maintain a force of 12 aircraft carriers since the long range shipbuilding plan
shows a total of 12 aircraft carriers between 2019 and the far range of the plan
in 2036.  It is apparent to the committee that the decision to allow the force
structure to fall to 10 in the near future is fiscally rather than operationally
driven.
The committee believes that the Navy should continue to maintain no less
than 12 operational aircraft carriers in order to meet potential global
commitments.  The committee believes that a reduction below 12 aircraft carriers
puts the nation in a position of unacceptable risk.  (Page 67)
The report also states:
The committee notes that the Department of Defense’s legislative proposal
for fiscal year 2007, included a section that would effectively allow retirement
of the conventionally-powered aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy, thereby
reducing the carrier force structure from 12 to 11 ships.
The committee believes that the Navy’s decision to reduce the number of
carriers was not based on mission requirements analysis; rather, the decision was
based on fiscal constraints.  Section 126 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) amended section 5062 of title 10,
United States Code, to set a minimum carrier force structure of not less than 12
operational aircraft carriers.  The committee believes the aircraft carrier force
structure should be maintained at 12 ships in order to meet worldwide
commitments.
However, the committee would like to explore options for maintaining the
USS John F. Kennedy in an operational status either within or outside the U.S.
Navy, to include the possibility of transferring operational control to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Therefore, the committee directs the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees
by March 1, 2007, that examines options for maintaining the USS John F.
Kennedy in an operational status both within and outside the U.S. Navy.  In
examining the NATO option, the Secretary shall coordinate an assessment with
the NATO Secretary General.  The report shall include the cost and manning
required, statutory restrictions that would preclude transfer of the USS John F.
Kennedy to organizations or entities outside the U.S. Navy, and a classified
annex on how the Navy would meet global operational requirements with an
aircraft carrier force structure of less than 12 ships.  (Pages 369-370)
The report also states:
The committee is concerned that the U.S. shipbuilding/ship repair industrial
base has significant capacity beyond what is necessary for all anticipated DOD
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new construction and maintenance work, and believes that Navy ship acquisition
programs are paying the price.
The Navy recently published a long-term shipbuilding plan that supports
the goal of building and maintaining a 313 ship Navy by 2020.  Although this
plan provides the needed “stability” that the U.S. shipbuilding industry has been
looking for, it does not appear to generate enough work to keep the major U.S.
shipbuilders operating at their current capacity.  Evidence of this is most obvious
at General Dynamics Electric Boat Division where the contractor is planning to
lay off hundreds of designers and engineers and thousands of production workers
in the next several years.  The plan to increase the procurement of Virginia class
submarines from 1 to 2 per year has been delayed for over 10 years and the latest
plan has the increase happening in fiscal year 2012.  Similar challenges will
affect the shipyards now constructing the last of the DDG-51 destroyers.  Those
yards are starting to ramp up to build the next generation destroyer, however, the
next generation destroyer is not expected to be built in a sufficient quantity to
keep the current workforce fully employed.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to report to the
congressional defense committees on measures that can be taken to manage the
capacity of the shipbuilding/ship repair industrial base in a manner that would
make Navy shipbuilding more affordable.  Such report shall be submitted by the
submission of the President’s request for fiscal year 2008, as required by section
1105 of title 31, United States Code.  (Pages 70-71)
Senate.  Section 1011 of S. 2766 would repeal Section 126 of the FY2006
defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163), which amended 10 USC 5062
to require that the Navy include not less than 12 operational aircraft carriers.  The
Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 109-254 of May 9, 2006),
states:
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report determined that a
naval force including 11 aircraft carriers meets the combat capability
requirements of the National Military Strategy.  In testimony before the
Committee on Armed Services in March 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) emphasized that the decision by the QDR followed a rigorous evaluation
of future force structure requirements by the Navy, and that 11 aircraft carriers
are sufficient to ensure the Navy’s ability to provide coverage in any foreseeable
contingency with persistent combat power.  The committee is further aware that
advances in ship systems, aircraft, and precision weapons, coupled with
fundamental changes to fleet maintenance and deployment practices
implemented by the Navy, have provided today’s aircraft carrier and associated
air wings substantially greater strike capability and greater force availability than
possessed by the fleet during previous quadrennial defense reviews.
The Navy has reported on revisions to its method and frequency of
deployments for vessels. Under the new concept, referred to as the “Fleet
Response Plan,” the Navy has reduced forward presence requirements in order
to increase surge capability in response to national security demands.  Under this
approach, with 12 aircraft carriers in the fleet, the Navy proposed to have six
carrier strike groups available for a crisis response within 30 days and two more
carrier strike groups available in 90 days, referred to as “6 plus 2.”  At a force
structure of 11 aircraft carriers, this becomes “6 plus 1" or “5 plus 2,” which the
Navy determined supports the National Military Strategy with acceptable risk.
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In certain cases, the success of the Fleet Response Plan relies on the
timeliness of the decision to surge-deploy the naval forces, and with smaller
force levels and reduced forward presence, the Fleet Response Plan approach
may increase risk if we do not have the level of insight into the threat necessary
for timely action.  Further, the Navy’s long-term plan for aircraft carrier force
structure declines to 10 carriers in 2013, when the USS Enterprise is scheduled
to retire.  That carrier would be replaced by CVN-21 in 2015, which has yet to
start construction.  The Navy believes that they can manage this gap through a
number of added measures, but if there are any delays in delivering CVN-21, this
gap will increase.
The committee maintains its concern, expressed in the Senate report
accompanying S. 1042 (S.Rept. 109-69) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006, regarding the declining size of the naval force and the
reduction to the number of aircraft carriers.  The committee agrees, however,
with the Navy’s determination that it is not feasible to maintain 12 operational
aircraft carriers by restoring the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) to a deployable,
fully mission-capable platform.  The committee believes that it is vital to the
national security of the United States that a fleet of at least 11 aircraft carriers be
maintained to support the National Military Strategy, and has taken extraordinary
action to support the CNO’s force structure plan by authorizing increased
procurement for shipbuilding and, specific to aircraft carriers, by authorizing
additional advance procurement and incremental funding for the construction of
the first 3 CVN-21 class aircraft carriers.
Further, recognizing the increased need for timeliness of surge operations
that today’s smaller force structure places on the Fleet Response Plan, the
committee reaffirms the judgment that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Clark, provided in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services in
February 2005, that the Atlantic Fleet should continue to be dispersed in two
homeports.  (Pages 379-380)
The report also states:
The committee remains concerned about the size of the Navy’s fleet.  As
a maritime nation, the strength of our economy, the face of our diplomacy, the
course of our foreign policy, and the security of our nation are built upon the
Navy’s ability to maintain global presence and to exercise freedom of maneuver
upon the seas.  However, in the last 15 years, there has been a declining trend in
shipbuilding and a diminishing capacity in the shipbuilding industrial base.  The
fleet has been reduced to its smallest size since before World War II.  The
committee believes that prudent decisions must be made to reverse the current
trend in the construction of warships, or risk our margin of naval superiority for
the next generation.  (Pages 6-7)
The report also states:
The Secretary of the Navy submitted a report to Congress on the long-range
plan for construction of naval vessels with the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
This plan reflects the determination by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that
the National Defense Strategy requires a fleet of 313 ships, including 48 attack
submarines, to meet the threat in future years.  In testimony before the
Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services, the Navy
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witnesses described the level of 48 attack submarines as the minimum level
necessary to support both wartime and peacetime requirements.
The Navy also indicated that, with currently planned construction, attack
submarine forces drop below 48 submarines for 15 years.  The future-years
defense program (FYDP) supports building only one attack submarine per year
through fiscal year 2011, with sufficient advance procurement during the FYDP
to support increasing the production rate to two boats per year in fiscal year
2012.  The Navy’s leadership has stated that they need to get the price of
Virginia-class attack submarines to a level of $2.0 billion per boat before
increasing the build rate.  The committee completely agrees with the Navy’s
affordability focus, but simultaneously views the most important step to improve
affordability is to increase the production rate of the Virginia-class to more than
one boat per year.
The committee understands that the Navy is trying to modernize in a
constrained fiscal environment.  However, the committee does not understand the
continuing delays in increasing the construction rate.  By the Navy’s own
assessment: (1) submarines perform a uniquely Navy mission; (2) the minimum
requirement is to have 48 attack submarines; (3) submarine force levels will fall
below 48 during the next decade and remain there for 15 years; (4) the Navy
needs to achieve cost reductions in attack submarine construction in order to
increase production rates without impinging on other priority shipbuilding
programs; and (5) there are potential technology insertion opportunities that
might help reduce costs and permit the Navy to increase the production rate.
Having said that, the Navy’s and industry’s plan for achieving the $2.0
billion per boat cost goal requires greater definition.  The Navy has referred to
efforts to develop a number of improvements for the Virginia-class that target
cost reductions.  The committee is concerned, however, that without more
specific plans with defined goals and benchmarks, the Navy will get to the end
of the FYDP and not necessarily be any closer to achieving real cost reductions
in this program.  Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to
submit with the fiscal year 2008 budget request a detailed plan for developing
cost reduction measures with defined goals and benchmarks for the
Virginia-class production program.  (Pages 115-116)
FY2007 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5631)
House.  The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-504
of June 16, 2006) on H.R. 5631, stated:
The Committee is pleased that the Navy has put stronger priority this year
on the need for a robust and stable shipbuilding program.  The fiscal year 2007
budget included funds for 7 new ships, compared to only 4 last year.  The future
years defense plan includes funds for 51 new ships between fiscal years 2007 and
2011, compared to 45 ships in last year’s plan.  The Navy has stated a
requirement for 313 force level ships to meet the projected naval threat in the
year 2020. Under the Navy’s current plan, that level is reached in the year 2012
and sustained until 2026.
Despite these improvements, the Committee believes that the viability of
the Navy’s long range plan will remain tied to the service’s ability to control
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costs in ship design and construction.  Navy leadership agrees that cost control
is essential, but the Navy has produced no plan or initiatives to meet the cost
targets assumed in the long range shipbuilding plan.  Furthermore, the recent
history of ongoing shipbuilding programs indicates the trend in cost growth may
be getting worse, and not better.  The Committee encourages the Navy to set firm
cost targets in its future shipbuilding programs, to develop specific initiatives
addressing cost control, and to sign contracts that reduce the likelihood of cost
growth.  (Page 139)
The report also states:
The Committee remains concerned over the lack of cost control in Navy
shipbuilding programs.  In last year’s report, the Committee noted the rising cost
growth in ongoing ship construction contracts, and required the Navy to submit
a plan on resolving these issues.  That report was submitted two months late, and
was little more than a summary of cost overruns in shipbuilding over the past two
decades.  The Committee is concerned about the gap between the Navy’s public
statements about the need for firm cost controls, and the programmatic and
contractual actions needed to accomplish that objective.  Navy briefings this year
document a litany of programs, including the CVN-77 aircraft carrier and certain
attack submarines of the Virginia class, that continue to defy attempts to control
costs.  The Navy estimates an overrun of $867,900,000 over the next 3 years
alone in the CVN-77 production effort.  These funds cannot be obligated without
Congressional legislation to raise the current cost cap on the program — a cap
that was put in place several years ago to control costs.  The fiscal year 2007
budget requests $136,000,000 for further cost growth in the U.S.S. Texas (SSN-
775), and cost performance on the U.S.S. North Carolina (SSN-777) is seriously
below Navy expectations.  In fact, current cost performance on the Virginia class
jeopardizes the ability of the Navy to meet the performance goals of the
multiyear contract signed in 2004 as well as cost targets needed to increase the
submarine production rate in future years.  The Committee is unwilling to
provide increased appropriations for cost overruns in the absence of compelling
justification or a realistic and detailed plan for cost control.  (Page 140)
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26 The plan approved in the 1997 QDR originally included 50 SSNs but was subsequently
amended to include 55 SSNs.
27 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, 2001,
p. 22.
28 Since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the total number of ships in the Navy
has been calculated using the battle force method of counting ships.  Battle force ships are
ships that are readily deployable and which contribute directly or indirectly to the deployed
combat capability of the Navy.  Battle force ships include active-duty Navy ships, Naval
Reserve Force ships, and ships operated by the Military Sealift Command that meet this
standard.  The total number of battle force ships includes not only combat ships but also
auxiliary and support ships — such as oilers, ammunition ships, and general stores ships —
that transport supplies to deployed Navy ships operating at sea.    The total number of battle
force ships does not include ships in reduced readiness status that are not readily deployable,
ships and craft that are not generally intended for making distant deployments,
oceanographic ships operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and DOD sealift and prepositioning ships that transport equipment and supplies
(usually for the benefit of the Army or Air Force) from one land mass to another.
29 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op. cit., p. 23.
30 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RS21305, Navy Littoral Combat Ship
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Appendix A: Previous Ambiguity In Navy Ship
Force-Structure Planning
This appendix reviews ambiguity in Navy ship force-structure planning prior to
the Navy’s reported 313-ship proposal.
310-Ship Plan From 2001 QDR 
Until the Navy’s reported 313-ship proposal, the last unambiguous ship force
structure plan for the Navy that was officially approved and published by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) appeared in the September 2001 report on the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  This plan, like the one approved in the
1997 QDR, included 12 aircraft carriers, 116 surface combatants, 55 nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs),26 and 36 amphibious ships organized into 12 amphibious
ready groups (ARGs) with a combined capability to lift the assault echelons of 2.5
Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).27  Although the 2001 QDR report did not
mention a total number of ships, this fleet was generally understood to include a total
of about 310 battle force ships.28  The 2001 QDR report also stated that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures — and as it produces significantly higher output of
military value from each element of the force — DOD will explore additional
opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.”29
Following the publication of the 2001 QDR report, the Navy took steps which
had the effect of calling into question the status of the 310-ship plan.  In November
2001, the Navy announced a plan for procuring a new kind of small surface
combatant, called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), that the Navy had not previously
planned to procure, and which was not mentioned in the 2001 QDR report.30  And in
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(LCS): Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report
RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 (DD(X)) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
31 The composition of the plan was subsequently modified to include 12 aircraft carriers, 52
SSNs, 4 SSGNs, 165 surface combatants (109 cruisers and destroyers and 56 LCSs), 36
amphibious ships, 18 Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships, and additional mine
warfare and support ships.
February 2003, in submitting its proposed FY2004-FY2009 Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP) to Congress, DOD announced that it had initiated studies on undersea
warfare requirements and forcible entry options for the U.S. military.  These studies
could affect, among the other things, the required numbers of SSNs and amphibious
ships.  The 310-ship plan is now rarely mentioned by Navy and DOD officials.
Navy 375-Ship Proposal Of 2002-2004
Navy leaders in early 2002 began to mention an alternative proposal for a 375-
ship Navy that initially included12 aircraft carriers, 55 SSNs, 4 converted Trident
cruise-missile-carrying submarines (SSGNs), 160 surface combatants (including 104
cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and 56 LCSs), 37 amphibious ships, and additional
mine warfare and support ships.31
Although Navy leaders routinely referred to the 375-ship proposal from about
February 2002 through about February 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
at a February 5, 2003, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee,
explicitly declined to endorse it as an official DOD goal, leaving it a Navy proposal
only.
In April 2004, Navy leaders began to back away from the 375-ship proposal,
stating that 375 was an approximate figure, that the ships making up the total of 375
were subject to change, and perhaps most important, that the 375-ship figure
reflected traditional concepts for crewing and deploying Navy ships, rather than new
concepts — such as Sea Swap — that could significantly reduce future requirements
for Navy ships.
Early-2005 Navy Proposal For Fleet Of 260 To 325 Ships
At a February 10, 2005 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on the proposed FY2006 DOD budget and FY2006-FY2011 FYDP, Admiral Vernon
Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified that the Navy in future years may
require a total of 260 to 325 ships, or possibly 243 to 302 ships, depending on how
much the Navy uses new technologies and Sea Swap.  Specifically, Clark stated:
As we evolve advanced concepts for employment of forces, we will also refine
analyses and requirements, to include the appropriate number of ships, aircraft,
and submarines....
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In a sensor-rich construct, the numbers of platforms are no longer a meaningful
measure of combat capability. And just as the number of people is no longer the
primary yardstick by which we measure the strength or productivity of an
organization in an age of increasing capital-for-labor substitutions, the number
of ships is no longer adequate to gauge the health or combat capability of the
Navy.  The capabilities posture of the Fleet is what is most important.  In fact,
your Navy can deliver much more combat power, more quickly now than we
could twenty years ago when we had twice as many ships and half again as many
people....
Further, I believe that the current low rate of ship construction and the resultant
escalation of platform cost will constrain the future size of the Fleet.  As I have
previously testified, I don’t believe that it’s all about numbers; numbers have a
quality all their own, there’s no question about that.  But, it is more important
that we buy the right kinds of capabilities in the ships that we’re procuring in the
future, and that we properly posture our force to provide the speed and agility for
seizing and retaining the initiative in any fight.
The ultimate requirement for shipbuilding, however, will be shaped by the
potential of emerging technologies, the amount of forward basing, and innovative
manning concepts such as Sea Swap.  Additional variables range from
operational availability and force posture to survivability and war plan timelines.
The notional diagram [above] illustrates how manning concepts and anticipated
technological adaptation will modify the number of ships required.  The [upper
and lower] lines represent levels of combat capability and the ships required to
achieve that capability.  For example, the left side of the diagram shows our
current number of ships (290) and the current projection of ships required to
fully meet Global War on Terror requirements (375) in the future.  The right side
of the diagram shows a projection that provides the same combat capability but
fully leverages technological advances with maximum use of Sea Swap.  It is a
range of numbers because the degree of technological adaptation is a variable,
as is the degree to which we can implement Sea Swap.  The middle portion of the
curve [in the ellipse] shows a projected range that assumes a less extensive
projection of technological adaptation and use of Sea swap.  Although simplified,
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Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 10, 2005,
pp. 17-19.
33 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
For The Construction Of Naval Vessels For FY 2006.  The report was delivered to the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees on March 23, 2005.  Copies of the report
were obtained by defense trade publications, and at least one of these publications posted
the report on its website.
34 See, for example, Geoff Fein, “Navy Needs To Better Refine Shipbuilding Numbers, Says
Sestak,” Defense Daily, Mar. 30, 2005; and Dave Ahearn, “Adm. Sestak Says Future
Shipbuilding Needs Must Be Flexible,” Defense Today, Mar. 30, 2005.
this diagram shows how the application of transformational new technologies
coupled with new manning concepts will enable us to attain the desired future
combat capability with a force posture between 260 and 325 ships.32
Admiral Clark’s testimony did not detail the compositions of these fleets by ship
type or make clear whether any of these potential total ship figures have been
endorsed by the Secretary of Defense as official DOD force-structure planning goals.
In March 2005, the Navy provided a report to Congress showing the notional
compositions of 260- and 325-ship fleets in FY2035.33  Table 1 below compares the
310-ship plan from the 2001 QDR and the Navy’s 375-ship proposal of 2002-2004
with the notional 260- and 325-ship fleets from the March 2005 Navy report to
Congress.
Using the 260-ship fleet as a baseline, the range of 260 to 325 ships equates to
a 25% range of variability in the potential total number  of ships.  For some ship
categories — such as SSBNs and SSGNs — there is little or no difference between
the 260- and 325-ship fleets.  For other categories of ships, there are substantial
percentage ranges of variability — 37% for cruisers, destroyers and frigates, 30% for
LCSs; 41% for amphibious ships; and 43% for maritime prepositioning ships.  For
the remaining categories of ships — attack submarines, aircraft carriers, combat
logistics ships, and other ships — the ranges of variability are 10% or less.  In the
case of aircraft carriers, the one-ship difference under two fleet plans can translate
into a substantial difference in Navy funding requirements and shipbuilding work.
When asked why the Navy has not expressed its force-level requirements as a
single figure, as it has in the past, or as a more tightly focused range, Navy officials
have stated that additional analyses need to be performed to tighten the range, that
some of the variability is due to the Navy’s inability to predict the future with
precision, and that the Navy needs to work to refine these figures further to establish
a more stable set of requirements for ships.34
Capabilities-Based Planning and Numbers of Ships
As suggested in Admiral Clark’s February 2005 testimony, DOD in recent years
has altered the basis of its force planning, shifting from threat-based planning to
capabilities-based planning.  Under threat-based planning, DOD planned its forces
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based on what would be needed for conflict scenarios that were defined fairly
specifically.  During the Cold War, for example, DOD planned forces that would be
sufficient, in conjunction with allied NATO forces, for fighting a multi-theater
conflict with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.  Similarly, in the first few
years of the post-Cold War era, DOD planned forces that would be sufficient for,
among other things, fighting two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts, one in the
Persian Gulf region, the other on the Korean peninsula.
Under capabilities-based planning, DOD is now planning for U.S. military
forces to have a variety of abilities, so that they will be better able to respond to a
wide array of possible conflict scenarios.  DOD officials have explained that the shift
to capabilities-based planning responds to the difficulty of predicting, in today’s
security environment, specific future threats and warfighting scenarios.
When asked about required numbers of Navy ships and aircraft, Navy and DOD
officials have argued, as Admiral Clark does in the above-cited testimony, that under
capabilities-based planning, numbers of ships and aircraft per se are not as important
as the total amount of capability represented in the fleet.  That may be correct insofar
as the policy objective is to have a Navy with a certain desired set of capabilities, and
not simply one that happens to include a certain number of ships and aircraft.  But
that is not the same as saying that a Navy with a desired set of capabilities cannot in
turn be described as one having certain numbers of ships and aircraft of certain types.
Although the Navy is currently working to resolve uncertainties concerning the
applicability of new technologies the Sea Swap concept, it arguably should become
possible at some point to translate a set of desired Navy into desired numbers of ships
and aircraft.  Those numbers might be expressed as focused ranges rather than
specific figures, and these focused ranges may change over time as missions,
technologies, and crewing concepts change.  But to argue indefinitely that desired
naval capabilities cannot be translated into desired numbers of ships and aircraft
would be to suggest that the Navy cannot measure and understand the capabilities of
its own ships and aircraft.  In this sense, the shift to capability-based planning does
not in itself constitute a rationale for permanently setting aside the question of the
planned size and structure of the fleet.
Implications of Ambiguity in Navy Force-Structure Plans
For the Navy.  For the Navy, ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy
ships provided time to resolve uncertainties concerning the applicability of new
technologies and the Sea Swap concept to various kinds of Navy ships.  Navy (and
DOD) officials may also have found this ambiguity convenient because it permitted
them to speak broadly about individual Navy ship-acquisition programs without
offering many quantitative details about them — details which they might be held
accountable to later, or which, if revealed now, might disappoint Members of
Congress or industry officials.
This ambiguity may also, however, have made it difficult for Navy officials, in
conversations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to defend programs
for procuring Navy ships in certain total numbers or at certain annual rates because
OSD officials might view alternative total numbers or annual rates as sufficient for
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35 For example, the conference report (H.Rept. 107-772) on the FY2003 defense
authorization act (P.L. 107-314/H.R. 4546) stated:
In many instances, the overall Department of Defense ship acquisition
message is confused....  The conferees also believe that the DON shares blame
for this confusion because it has been inconsistent in its description of force
structure requirements.  This situation makes it appear as if the Navy has not
fully evaluated the long-term implications of its annual budget requests....
The conferees perceive that DOD lacks a commitment to buy the number and
type of ships required to carry out the full range of Navy missions without
redundancy.  The DON has proposed to buy more ships than the stated
requirement in some classes, while not requesting sufficient new hulls in other
classes that fall short of the stated requirement.  Additionally, the conferees
believe that the cost of ships will not be reduced by continually changing the
number of ships in acquisition programs or by frequently changing the
configuration and capability of those ships, all frequent attributes of recent DON
shipbuilding plans.  (Pages 449 and 450)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 108-553) on the FY2005
DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 4613), stated:
The Committee remains deeply troubled by the lack of stability in the Navy’s
shipbuilding program.  Often both the current year and out year ship construction
profile is dramatically altered with the submission of the next budget request.
Programs justified to Congress in terms of mission requirements in one year’s
budget are removed from the next.  This continued shifting of the shipbuilding
program promotes confusion and frustration throughout both the public and
private sectors.  Moreover, the Committee is concerned that this continual
shifting of priorities within the Navy’s shipbuilding account indicates uncertainty
with respect to the validity of requirements and budget requests in support of
shipbuilding proposals.  (Page 164)
See also the Legislative Activity section of this report, particularly for comments in
committee reports on the FY2006 defense authorization and appropriation bills.
maintaining a Navy that falls somewhere within the broad ranges of total numbers
of ships that Navy officials have presented in their testimony.
For Congress.  Ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy ships made
it more difficult for Congress to conduct effective oversight by reconciling desired
Navy capabilities with planned Navy force structure, and planned Navy force
structure with supporting Navy programs and budgets.  With the middle element of
this oversight chain expressed in only general terms, it was more difficult for
Congress to understand whether proposed programs and budgets will produce a Navy
with DOD’s desired capabilities.  The defense oversight committees in recent years
have criticized the Navy for presenting a confused and changing picture of Navy ship
requirements and procurement plans.35
For Industry.  Ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy ships may
have made it easier for industry officials to pour into broad remarks from the Navy
or DOD their own hopes and dreams for individual programs.  This could have led
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36 A July 2004 press article, for example, states that
Philip Dur, chief executive officer of Northrop Grumman’s Shipbuilding
Systems, argued that the Navy’s concept of “capabilities versus numbers” not
only would hurt the service’s operations, but decimate the industry.
If the Navy decides it cannot afford 300 ships, it should come up with a
smaller number and set new ship construction plans based on that number, Dur
said.
It also would be helpful, he added, if both the Navy and the Coast Guard
jointly planned their long-term shipbuilding buys. “I do not know that either
service takes the other service’s capabilities into account,” he said. If both
services set their shipbuilding goals collectively, “then the shipbuilders can lay
out an investment plan, a hiring plan [and] a training plan that was predicated on
the assumption that we would competing for an X-number of platforms per year
on a going-forward basis,” Dur said....
If the Department of Defense can frame a requirement for ships and defend
it, the industry would make the necessary adjustments to either scale down or
ramp up, Dur told reporters during a recent tour of the company’s shipyards in
Louisiana and Mississippi.
(Roxana Tiron, “Lack of Specificity in Navy Shipbuilding Plans Irks the Industry,”
National Defense, July 2004.)
to excessive industry optimism about those programs.  Ambiguity concerning
required numbers of Navy ships also made it more difficult for industry to make
rational business-planning decisions in areas such as production planning, workforce
management, facilities investment, company-sponsored research and development,
and potential mergers and acquisitions.36
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37 Section 216 is an amended version of a provision (Section 217) in the House-reported
version of H.R. 1588.  See H.Rept. 108-354, pp.28-29, 612-613; and H.Rept. 108-106, May
16, 2003, pp.255-256.
38 This appendix is adapted from a part of a statement made by the author before the Senate
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower, Hearing on Navy Capabilities and
Force Structure, Apr. 12, 2005.
39 Delwyn Gilmore, with contributions by Mark Lewellyn et al., Report to Congress
Regarding Naval Force Architecture, Center for Naval Analyses, CRM D0011303.A2/1Rev,
Jan. 2005. 
Appendix B:  Independent Studies On Navy Force
Structure
Section 216 of the conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November 7, 2003)
on the FY2004 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24,
2003) required the Secretary of Defense to provide for two independently performed
studies on potential future fleet platform architectures (i.e., potential force structure
plans) for the Navy.  The two studies, which were conducted by the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force Transformation (OFT, a part of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense), were submitted to the congressional defense committees
in February 2005.37
A third independent study on potential future fleet platform architectures  was
conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).  CSBA
conducted this study on its own initiative and made it available to congressional and
other audiences in March 2005 as an alternative to the CNA and OFT studies.
This appendix summarizes and discusses these three studies.38
Force Structure Recommendations
CNA Report.39  The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships and
naval formations as those planned by the Navy.  The report recommends a Navy
force structure range of 256 to 380 ships.  The low end of the range assumes a greater
use of crew rotation and overseas homeporting of Navy ships than the high end.
Table 6 below compares the CNA-recommended force range to the Navy’s 375-ship
fleet proposal of 2002-2004 and the notional 260- and 325-ship fleets for FY2035
presented in the Navy’s March 2005 interim report to Congress.
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National Defense University, 2005.  96 pp.  (Defense & Technology Paper 19, Center for
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Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 14 14 14 14
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) 4 4 4 4
Attack submarines (SSNs) 38 to 62 52 37 41
Aircraft carriers 10 to 12 12 10 11
Cruisers and destroyers 66 to 112 109 67 92
Littoral combat ships (LCSs) 40 to 70 56 63 82
Amphibious ships 18 to 30 36 17 24
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
ships
19 to 21 18 14 20
Combat logistics (resupply) ships 25 to 33 33 24 26
Otherb 22 41 10 11
Total battle force ships 256 to 380 375 260 325
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CNA report and March 2005 Navy report.
a.  Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022.  An earlier and somewhat
different composition is shown elsewhere in this CRS report.
b.  Includes command ships, support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders), dedicated
mine warfare ships, and sea basing connector ships.
OFT Report.40  The OFT report employs eight new ship designs that differ
substantially from the designs of most ships currently in the fleet, under construction,
or planned for procurement.  Among the eight new ship designs are four types of
large surface ships that would be built from a common, relatively inexpensive,
merchant-like hull design developed in 2004 for the Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future) analysis of alternatives.  These four types of ships, which would all
displace 57,000 tons, include:
! An aircraft carrier that would embark a notional air wing of 30
Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs), 6 MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and
15 unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).  The total of 36 manned aircraft
is about half as many as in today’s carrier air wings, and the OFT
architecture envisages substituting two of these new carriers for each
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of today’s carriers.  This new carrier would also have support spaces
for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs), and mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface
combatant described below.
! A missile-and-rocket ship that would be quipped with 360 vertical
launch system (VLS) missile tubes and 4 trainable rocket launchers.
Additional spaces on this ship could be used to support UUVs,
USVs, and mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface combatant.
Alternatively, these spaces could be used to provide limited stowage
and working space for the 100-ton surface combatant described
below, and mission modules for these 100-ton ships.
! An amphibious assault ship that would embark a notional air wing
of either 30 CH-46 equivalents or 6 JSFs, 18 MV-22s, and 3
gyrocopter heavy-lift helicopters.  It would also have spaces for
Marine Corps equipment, unmanned vehicles, and mission modules
for the 1,000-ton surface combatant.
! A “mother ship” for small combatants that would contain stowage
and support spaces for the 100-ton surface combatant described
below.
The four other new-design ships in the OFT architecture are:
! A 13,500-ton aircraft carrier based on a conceptual surface effect
ship (SES)/catamaran hull design developed in 2001 by a team at the
Naval Postgraduate School.  This ship would embark a notional air
wing of 8 JSFs, 2 MV-22s, and 8 UAVs. The total of 10 manned
aircraft is roughly one-eighth as many as in today’s carrier air wings,
and the OFT architecture envisages substituting eight of these new
carriers for each of today’s carriers.  This new ship would have a
maximum speed of 50 to 60 knots.
! A 1,000-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of 40 to 50
knots and standard interfaces for accepting various modular mission
packages.  These ships would self-deploy to the theater and would
be supported in theater by one or more of the 57,000-ton ships
described above.
! A 100-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of 60 knots
and standard interfaces for accepting various modular mission
packages.  These ships would be transported to the theater by the
57,000-ton mother ship and would be supported in theater by that
ship and possibly also the 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship.
! A non-nuclear-powered submarine equipped with an air-
independent propulsion (AIP) system.  These AIP submarines would
be lower-cost supplements to the Navy’s nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) and would be transported from home port to the
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41 The report states that “Alternatives to the SSNs in formations were diesel Air Independent
Propulsion (AIP) submarines and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs).  The AIP
submarines were substituted for Virginia class SSNs on a cost basis of roughly four to one.
These submarines could be nuclear-powered if they are designed and built based upon a
competitive, cost suppressing business model.”  (Page 60)  The strategy of transporting the
AIP submarines to the theater using transport ships is not mentioned in the report but was
explained at a February 18, 2005 meeting between CRS and analysts who contributed to the
OFT report.
theater of operations by transport ships.  The OFT architecture
envisages substituting four of these submarines for the SSN in each
carrier strike group.41
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants would be built as relatively
inexpensive sea frames, like the LCS.
The OFT report combines these eight types of ships,  plus the Navy’s currently
planned TAOE-class resupply ship, into a fleet that would include a much larger total
number of ships than planned by the Navy, about the same number of carrier-based
aircraft as planned by the Navy, and large numbers of unmanned systems.  The OFT
report presents three alternative versions of this fleet, which the report calls
Alternatives A, B, and C.  The report calculates that each of these alternatives would
be equal in cost to the equivalent parts of the Navy’s 375-ship proposal.  Each of
these alternative force structures, like the equivalent parts of the Navy’s 375-ship
proposal, would be organized into 12 carrier strike groups (CSGs), 12 expeditionary
strike groups (ESGs), and 9 surface strike groups (SSGs).  The three alternative force
structures are shown in Table 7 below.




57,000-ton aircraft carrier 24 24 0
57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship 33 33 33
57,000-ton amphibious assault ship 24 24 24
57,000-ton mother ship 0 24 24
13,500-ton aircraft carrier 0 0 96
1,000-ton surface combatant 417 0 0
100-ton surface combatant 0 609 609
AIP submarine 48 48 48
TAOE-class resupply ship 12 12 12
Subtotal 1,000- and 100-ton ships 417 609 609
Subtotal other ships 141 165 237
Total shipsa 558a 774a 846a
Source:  Table prepared by CRS based on figures in OFT report.
a.  The totals shown in early copies of the OFT report are 36 ships lower in each case due to an error
in those copies in calculating the numbers of ships in the 12 carrier strike groups.
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Maritime Supremacy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2005.
The totals shown in the table do not include SSNs, cruise missile submarines
(SSGNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating independently of the
12 CSGs, 12 ESGs, and 9 SSGs.  The totals also do not include combat logistics
ships other than the TAOEs (e.g., oilers, ammunition ships, and general stores ships)
and fleet support ships.  The Navy’s 375-ship proposal, by comparison, includes all
these kinds of ships.
As also can be seen from the table, the difference between Alternatives A and
B is that the former uses 1,000-ton surface combatants while the latter uses 100-ton
surface combatants that are transported into the theater by mother ships, and the
difference between Alternatives B and C is that the former uses 57,000-ton aircraft
carriers while the latter substitutes 13,500-ton carriers.
CSBA Report.42  The CSBA report uses many of the same ship designs
currently planned by the Navy, but also proposes some new ship designs.  The CSBA
report also proposes ship formations that in some cases are different than those
planned by the Navy.  Table 8 below compares the CSBA-recommended force
structure to CNA’s recommended force range, the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal of
2002-2004, and the notional 260- and 325-ship fleets for FY2035 presented in the
Navy’s March 2005 interim report to Congress.
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Table 8.  CSBA-Recommended Force and Other Proposals

















b 14 14 14 14
Cruise missile submarines
(SSGNs)
6 b 4 4 4 4
Attack submarines (SSNs) 54c 38 to 62 52 37 41
Large-deck aircraft carriers
(CVNs) 10 10 to 12 12 10 11
Medium aircraft carriers
(CVEs)
4 0 0 0 0
Afloat forward staging base
(AFSB) 1 0 0 0 0
Cruisers and destroyers 84 or 86 66 to 112 109 67 92
Littoral combat ships
(LCSs)
84 40 to 70 56 63 82
Amphibious ships 32d 18 to 30 36 17 24
Maritime Prepositioning
Force ships 16
e 19 to 21e 18e 14e 20e
Combat logistics (resupply)
ships
36f 25 to 33 33 24 26
Otherg 34h 22 41 10 11
Total battle force ships 373 or 375i 256 to 380 375 260 325
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CSBA report, CNA report, and March 2005 Navy report.
a.  Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022.  An earlier and somewhat
different composition is shown elsewhere in this CRS report.
b.  Alternatively, 10 SSBNs and 8 SSGNs.
c.  Includes one special-mission submarine.  Total number drops slightly over next 12 years.
d.  Includes eight LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.
e.  In the CSBA force, these are existing MPF ships; in the other fleets, they are MPF(Future) ships.
f.  Includes eight TAOEs, 11 TAKEs, and 17 TAOs.
g.  Includes command ships, and support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders),
dedicated mine warfare ships, and sea basing connector ships.
h.  Includes, among other ships,  2 TAVBs and 8 TLKAs associated with the amphibious and MPF
ships.
i.  In addition to these ships, the CSBA report notes that U.S. maritime forces would include 35 DOD
prepositioning and surge sealift ships used primarily by the Army and Air Force, and 91 large,
medium, and fast-response (i.e., small) cutters planned for procurement under the Coast Guard
Deepwater acquisition program.
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The CSBA report makes numerous specific recommendations for ship force
structure and ship acquisition, including the following:
Aircraft Carriers.  When the George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) enters service in
2008 or 2009:
! Retire the two remaining conventional carriers — the Kitty Hawk
CV-63) and the Kennedy (CV-67).
! Convert the Enterprise (CVN-65) into an afloat forward staging base
(AFSB) with a mixed active/reserve/civilian crew, to be used in
peacetime for aviation testing and in crises for embarking special
operations forces, Army or Marine Corps forces, or joint air wings.
! Begin replacing the 10 Nimitz (CVN-68) class carriers on a one-for-
one basis with CVN-21-class carriers procured once every five years
using incremental funding.
! Redesignate the LHA(R) as a medium sized carrier (CVE) and
procure one every three years starting in FY2007 using incremental
funding.43
Submarines.
! Maintain Virginia-class SSN procurement at one per year for the
next several years, producing an eventual total of perhaps 20
Virginia-class boats.
! Begin immediately to design a new “undersea superiority system”
with a procurement cost 50% to 67% that of the Virginia-class
design, with the goal of achieving a procurement rate of two or three
of these boats per year no later than FY2019.
! Study options for extending the service lives of the three Seawolf
SSNs and the 31 final Los Angeles-class SSNs to mitigate the
projected drop in SSN force levels during the 2020s.
! Reduce the SSBN force from 14 ships to 12 ships and convert an
additional two SSBNs into SSGNs, for a total of six SSGNs.
! Study the option of reducing the SSBN force further, to 10 ships,
which would permit another two SSBNs to be converted into
SSGNs, for a total of eight SSGNs.44
Destroyers and Cruisers.
! Procure a single DDG-1000 in FY2007, using research and
development funding, as the first of three surface combatant
technology demonstrators.
! Start a design competition for a next generation, modular surface
combatant or family of combatants, with capabilities equal to or
greater than the DDG-1000/CG(X), but with a substantially lower
procurement cost.
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reduced-cost alternative to the DDG-1000 include a surface combatant based on the LPD-17
design, a semi-submersible ship built to commercial standards (like a ship called the
“Stryker” that was proposed several years ago), and a large or medium “carrier of large
objects,” perhaps built to relaxed commercial standards.
46 CSBA report, slides 275, 277, and 283.
! Build two additional surface combatant technology demonstrators to
compete against the DDG-1000 design.
! Use the results of this competition to inform the design of a new
surface combatant, called SCX, with a procurement cost perhaps
one- third to one-half that of the DDG-1000.
! Begin procuring this new design in FY2015 as a replacement for the
DDG-1000/CG(X) program.
! Consider modifying the LPD-17 design into a low-cost naval surface
fire support ship carrying the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that was
to be carried by the DDG-1000.
! Consider procuring two additional DDG-51s to help support the
surface combatant industrial base in the near-term.45
Littoral Combat Ships and Coast Guard Deepwater Cutters.
! Procure six LCSs per year for a total of 84 LCSs — 42 of the
Lockheed design, and 42 of the General Dynamics design.
! Organize these 84 ships into 42 divisions, each consisting of one
Lockheed ship and one General Dynamics ship, so that each division
can benefit from the complementary strengths of the two designs.
! Ensure that mission packages for the LCS and mission packages for
the Coast Guard’s large and medium Deepwater cutters are as
mutually compatible as possible.
! Include the Coast Guard’s Deepwater cutters when counting ships
that contribute to the country’s total fleet battle network.
! Begin a research and development and experimentation program
aimed at building several competing stealth surface combatant
technology demonstrators for operations in contested or denied-
access waters.46
Amphibious Ships.
! Complete LHD-8 to create a force of eight LHDs.
! Rather than stopping procurement of LPD-17s after the ninth ship in
FY2007, as now planned by the Navy, increase the LPD-17
procurement rate to two ships per year and use multiyear
procurement (MYP) to procure a total of 24 LPD-17s.
! Retire the 12 existing LSD-41/49 class ships, leaving a 32-ship
amphibious fleet consisting of eight LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.
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! Form eight “distributed expeditionary strike bases” — each of which
would include one LHD, three LPD-17s, one Aegis cruiser, three
Aegis destroyers, two LCSs, and one SSGN.47
MPF and Other Ships.
! Retain the three existing MPF squadrons over the near- to mid-term.
! Reconfigure two of the squadrons for irregular warfare. 
! Use the third squadron as a swing asset to either reinforce the two
irregular-warfare squadrons or to provide lift for assault follow-on
echelon amphibious landing forces.
! Develop high-speed intra-theater and ship-to-shore surface
connectors.
! Design an attack cargo ship (TAKA) to help support sustained joint
operations ashore, with a target unit procurement cost of $500
million or less, and begin procuring this ship in FY2014.
! Replace the two existing hospital ships, the four existing command
ships, and existing support tenders with new ships based on the
LPD-17 design.
! Initiate a joint experimental program for future sea-basing platforms
and technologies.48
The CSBA report raises several questions about the Navy’s emerging sea basing
concept for conducting expeditionary operations ashore.  The report states:
The work done thus far on sea basing is intriguing, but neither the concept nor
the supporting technologies appear sufficiently mature to justify any near-term
decisions such as canceling LPD-17 [procurement] in favor of MPF(F) ships, or
removing the well deck from the big deck amphibious assault platforms, both of
which would severely curtail the [fleet’s] ability to launch surface assaults over
the longer term.
Given these large uncertainties, no major moves toward the sea basing vision
should be made without further exploring the sea basing concept itself, and
experimenting with different numbers and types of sea base platforms,
connectors, and capabilities.49
Observations
Observations about the CNA, OFT, and CSBA reports can be made on several
points, including the following:
! organizations and authors;
! analytical approach;
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! use of prospective ship-procurement funding levels as a force-
planning consideration;
! fleet size and structure;
! whether the recommended force qualifies as an alternative fleet
architecture;
! fleet capability;
! transition risks; and
! implications for the industrial base.
Each of these is discussed below.
Organizations and Authors.
CNA Report.  CNA is a federally funded research and development center
(FFRDC) that does much of its analytical at the Navy’s request.  The CNA report’s
discussion of how crew rotation may alter force-level requirements for maintaining
day-to-day forward deployments is somewhat detailed and may have been adapted
from other work that CNA has done on the topic for the Navy.
OFT Report.  The OFT report was prepared under the direction of retired Navy
admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who was the director of OFT from October 29, 2001 until
January 31, 2005 and the President of the Naval War College (NWC) from July 24,
1998 to August 22, 2001.  During his time at NWC and OFT, Cebrowski was a
leading proponent of network-centric warfare and distributed force architectures.
CSBA Report.  The CSBA report was prepared by Robert Work, CSBA’s
analyst for maritime issues.  CSBA describes itself as “an independent, policy
research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning
and investment strategies for the 21st century.  CSBA’s analytic-based research
makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering
a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the US military in
light of an emerging military revolution.”50  CSBA’s Executive Director is Dr.
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., whose previous experience includes work in DOD’s
Office of Net Assessment, the office directed by Andrew Marshall.  Krepinevich is
generally considered a major writer on defense transformation.
Analytical Approach.
CNA Report.  The CNA report grounds its analysis in traditional DOD force-
planning considerations and campaign modeling.  The report cites past DOD force-
planning studies that reflect similar approaches.  The implicit argument in the CNA
report is that its findings have weight in part because they reflect a well-established
and systematic approach to the problem.
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53 These three things are: (1) contribute to the global war on terrorism (GWOT); (2) prepare
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55 CNA Report, p. 36.
OFT Report.  In contrast to the CNA report, the OFT report “calls into
question the viability of the longstanding logic of naval force building.”51  The OFT
report grounds its analysis in four major force-design principles that the report
identifies as responsive to future strategic challenges and technological
opportunities.52  The report then seeks to design a fleet that it is consistent with these
principles, and assesses that fleet using a new set of metrics that the report believes
to be consistent with these principles.  The implicit argument in the OFT report is
that its findings have weight in part because they reflect major force-design principles
that respond to future strategic challenges and technological opportunities.
CSBA Report.  The CSBA report employs an extensive historical analysis of
the missions and structure of the U.S. Navy and other navies.  The report argues that
the structure of the U.S. Navy has shifted over time in response to changes in
technology and U.S. security challenges, and that U.S. military forces have entered
a new security era (which the report calls the “Joint Expeditionary Era”) during
which the U.S. Navy will need to do three things.53  To do these three things, the
report argues, the Navy should be structured to include four different force
elements.54  The report constructs these four force elements and then combines them
to arrive at an overall recommended Navy force structure.  The implicit argument in
the CSBA report is that its findings have weight in part because they reflect insights
about future missions and force requirements gained through careful historical
analysis of the missions and structure of the U.S. Navy and other navies.
Prospective Ship-Procurement Funding Levels as Consideration.
CNA Report.  The CNA report aims at designing a cost-effective fleet.  It also
mentions cost estimates relating to the option of homeporting additional attack
submarines at Guam.55  Prospective ship-procurement funding levels, however, are
not prominently featured in the CNA report as a force-planning consideration.
OFT Report.  Prospective ship-procurement funding levels are a significant
force-planning consideration in the OFT report.  The report argues that an important
metric for assessing a proposed fleet architecture is the ease or difficulty with which
it can be scaled up or down to adapt to changes in ship-procurement funding levels.
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potential ranges of 290 to 375 ships, 260 to 325 ships, and 243 to 302 ships presented in the
Navy’s February 2005 testimony to Congress.  The mid-point of the CNA-recommended
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2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  Unlike the 2001 QDR fleet, however, the
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numbers of other kinds of ships.
The OFT report contains a fairly detailed discussion of the Navy’s budget
situation that calls into question, on several grounds, the Navy’s prospective ability
to afford its 375-ship proposal.  The report concludes that funding for Navy ship-
procurement in future years may fall as much as 40% short of what would be needed
to achieve the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal.  If the shortfall is 40%, the report
estimates, the Navy could maintain a force of 270 to 315 ships, which is comparable
in number to today’s force of 282 ships, except that the future force would include
a substantial number of relatively inexpensive LCSs.  If proportionate reductions are
applied to the OFT fleets shown in Table 7, Alternative A would include 402 to 469
ships, Alternative B would include 557 to 650 ships, and Alternative C would include
609 to 711 ships.  Again, these totals would not include certain kinds of ships
(independently operating SSNs, etc.) that are included in the total of 270 to 315 ships
associated with the Navy’s currently planned architecture.
CSBA Report.  As with the OFT report, prospective ship-procurement funding
levels are a significant force-planning consideration in the CSBA report.  The CSBA
report estimates that in future years, the Navy may have an average of about $10
billion per year in ship-acquisition funding.  The report then aims at designing a force
whose ships could be acquired for this average annual amount of funding.
Fleet Size and Structure.
CNA Report.  The 380-ship fleet at the high end of the CNA range is similar
in size and composition to the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal.  The 256-ship fleet at
the low end of the CNA range is similar in size and composition to the Navy’s 260-
ship fleet for FY2035, except that the 260-ship fleet has more LCSs and fewer ships
in the “other ships” category.56
OFT Report.  The OFT-recommended fleet would have a much larger total
number of ships than the Navy’s planned fleet.  The OFT fleet would also feature a
much larger share of small combatants.  Of the ships shown in Table 7, the small
combatants account for about 75% in Alternative A, about 79% in Alternative B, and
about 72% in Alternative C.  (Adding into the mix SSNs and other kinds of ships not
shown in Table 7 would reduce these percentages somewhat.)  In the Navy’s notional
260- and 325-ship fleets, by contrast, LCSs account for about 25% of the total
number of ships.
The OFT architecture is similar in certain ways to a fleet architecture proposed
by the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) between 1989 and 1992 and
sometimes referred to as the Carrier of Large Objects (CLO) proposal.  The NSWC
architecture, like the OFT architecture, employed a common hull design for a large
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ship that could be built in several variants for various missions, including aviation,
missile launching and fire support, amphibious warfare, logistics support, and
mother-ship support of small, fast, surface combatants.  The small, fast surface
combatants in the NSWC architecture were called scout fighters and were in the same
general size range as the 100- and 1,000-ton surface combatants in the OFT
architecture.57
CSBA Report.  The CSBA force would have about the same total number of
ships as the Navy’s 375-ship fleet proposal.  CSBA’s subtotals for some ship
categories are similar to subtotals in one or more of the other fleet proposals shown
in Table 6.  Significant differences between the CSBA proposal and the other fleet
proposals shown in Table 8 include:
! the four medium-sized aircraft carriers (CVEs);
! the conversion of a carrier into an afloat forward staging base;
! the composition of the cruiser-destroyer force (which would include
SCXs rather than DDG-1000s and CG(X)s);
! the composition of the amphibious fleet (which would have
additional LPD-17s in lieu of today’s LSD-41/49s); and
! the composition of the maritime prepositioning force (which would
continue to include, for a time at least, today’s MPF ships rather than
the Navy’s planned MPF(F) ships).
Does it Qualify as an Alternative Force Architecture.
CNA Report.  As mentioned earlier, the CNA report uses essentially the same
kinds of ships and naval formations as those planned by the Navy.  If an alternative
fleet platform architecture is defined as one that uses ship types or naval formations
that differ in some significant way from those currently used or planned, then the
CNA-recommended force arguably would not qualify as an alternative fleet platform
architecture.
OFT Report.  Since the OFT report proposes building ships that are
substantially different from those currently planned, and combines them ships into
formations which, although similar in name to currently planned formations (i.e.,
CSGs, ESGs, and SSGs), might be viewed by some observers as substantially
different in composition from the currently planned versions of these formations, the
CRS-49
58 For more on the arsenal ship, see CRS Report 97-455, Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship
Program: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report 97-1044,
Navy/DARPA Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator (Arsenal Ship) Program: Issues Arising
From Its Termination, by Ronald O’Rourke.  Both reports are out of print and are available
directly from the author.
OFT-recommended force arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet platform
architecture.
CSBA Report.  Since the CSBA report proposes building ships that in some
cases are different from those currently planned, and combines these ships into
formations that in some cases are different in composition from those currently
planned, the CSBA-recommended force arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet
platform architecture, though less dramatically so than the OFT-recommended force.
New Ship Designs.
CNA Report.  The CNA report does not propose any ship designs other than
those already planned by the Navy.
OFT Report.  The 57,000-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would be
roughly the same size as the United Kingdom’s new aircraft carrier design, and
somewhat larger than the U.S. Navy’s 40,000-ton LHA/LHD-type amphibious
assault ships.  Compared to the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers, which displace 81,000
to 102,000 tons, this ship could be considered a medium-size carrier.
The 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship in the OFT report could be considered
similar in some respects to the Navy/DARPA arsenal ship concept of 1996-1997,
which would have been a large, relatively simple surface ship equipped with about
500 VLS tubes.58
The 13,500-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would be slightly larger than
Thailand’s aircraft carrier, which was commissioned in 1997, and somewhat smaller
than Spain’s aircraft carrier, which was based on a U.S. design and was
commissioned in 1988.  Due to its SES/catamaran hull design, this 13,500-ton ship
would be much faster than the Thai and Spanish carriers (or any other aircraft carrier
now in operation), and might have a larger flight deck.  This ship could be considered
a small, high-speed aircraft carrier.
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants in the OFT report could be viewed
as similar to, but smaller than, the 2,500- to 3,000-ton Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
Compared to the LCS, they would be closer in size to the Streetfighter concept (a
precursor to the LCS that was proposed by retired admiral Cebrowski during his time
at the Naval War College).
The AIP submarine in the OFT report could be similar to AIP submarines
currently being developed and acquired by a some foreign navies.
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CSBA Report.  The proposal in the CSBA report for an afloat forward staging
base (AFSB) is similar to other proposals for AFSBs that have been reported in
recent years, though other proposals have suggested using commercial ships or
military sealift ships rather than converted aircraft carriers as the basis for the
AFSB.59
The CVE in the CSBA report, like the 57,000-ton carrier in the OFT report, can
be viewed as a medium-sized carrier.  With a full load displacement of perhaps about
40,000 tons, the CVE would be somewhat smaller than the 57,000-ton carrier and
consequently might embark a smaller air wing.  The CVE, however, would be based
on the LHA(R) amphibious ship design rather than a merchant-like hull, and
consequently could incorporate more survivability features than the 57,000-ton
carrier.
The proposal in the CSBA report for a new undersea superiority system with a
procurement cost 50% to 67% that of the Virginia-class SSN design is similar to the
Tango Bravo SSN discussed earlier in this testimony.
The proposals in the CSBA report for a reduced-cost new-design surface
combatant called the SCX, and for a low-cost gunfire support ship, are broadly
similar to the options for a reduced-cost new-design surface combatant discussed
earlier in this testimony.
Fleet Capability.
CNA Report.  The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships and
formations as planned by the Navy, and recommends generally the same numbers of
ships as a function of force-planning variables such as use of crew rotation.  As a
consequence, the CNA-recommended force range would be roughly similar in overall
capability to the Navy’s planned architecture.
OFT Report.  The OFT architecture differs so significantly from the Navy’s
planned architecture that assessing its capability relative to the Navy’s planned
architecture is not easy.  As a general matter, the OFT report stresses overall fleet
survivability more than individual-ship survivability, and argues that fleet
effectiveness can be enhanced by presenting the enemy with a complex task of
having to detect, track, and target large numbers of enemy ships.  The OFT report
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60 The OFT report argues that its recommended fleet architecture would:
! “provide a quantum leap ahead in capabilities against a spectrum of
enemies ranging from large, highly developed competitors to small but
determined asymmetric adversaries” (page 6) and be adaptable, in a
dynamic and less-predictable security environment, to changing strategic
or operational challenges;
! be capable of both participating in joint expeditionary operations and
maintaining “the strategic advantage the Navy has developed in the global
commons,” avoiding a need to choose between optimizing the fleet for
“performance against asymmetric challenges at the expense of its ability
to confront a potential adversary capable of traditional high intensity
conflict,”such as China; (pages 1 and 2)
! pose significant challenges to adversaries seeking to counter U.S. naval
forces due to the “large numbers of combat entities that the enemy must
deal with; a great variety of platforms with which the enemy must
contend; speed; different combinations of forces; distribution of forces
across large areas; and [adversary] uncertainty as to the mission and
capabilities of a given platform;” (page i)
! permit more constant experimentation with new operational concepts, and
thereby achieve higher rates of learning about how to evolve the fleet over
time; and
! recognize potential future constraints on Navy budgets and make the Navy
more smoothly scalable to various potential future resource levels by
shifting from a fleet composed of limited numbers of relatively expensive
ships to one composed of larger numbers of less expensive ships.
argues that in addition to warfighting capability, a fleet can be judged in terms of its
capability for adapting to changes in strategic demands and funding levels.60
Readers who agree with most or all of these propositions might conclude that
the OFT-recommended architecture would be more capable than the Navy’s planned
architecture.  Readers who disagree with most or all of these propositions might
conclude that the OFT-recommended architecture would be less capable than the
Navy’s planned architecture.  Readers who agree with some of these propositions but
not others (or who agree with these propositions up to a certain point, but less
fervently than OFT), might conclude that the OFT-recommended architecture might
be roughly equal in total capability to the Navy’s planned architecture.
In addressing the question of fleet capability, the OFT report states:
Alternative fleet formations consisting of small fast and relatively
inexpensive craft combining knowledge and attaining flexibility through
networking appear superior to the programmed fleet for non-traditional warfare
in a variety of settings.  This is due to increasing the complexity the enemy faces
and increasing U.S. fleet options that in turn reduce enemy options.  The speed
and complexity of the alternative fleets can provide them with the capability to
complicate and possibly defeat the attempts of non-traditional adversaries to
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elude surveillance.  The enemy could have difficulty determining what to expect
and how to defeat them all.  The superior speed and more numerous participants
than in the programmed fleet provide a stronger intelligence base and more
numerous platforms from which to conduct strikes and interceptions.  This
appears to be true even if the smaller craft are individually somewhat less
capable and less able to sustain a hit than the larger ships in the programmed
fleet.
If these circumstances are not achieved, and the enemy can continue to
elude and deceive, the [Navy’s] programmed fleet often is as good as the [OFT]
alternatives, sometimes even better.  It is not necessarily better in cases in which
individual ship survivability dominates, a perhaps counterintuitive result until we
realize that fleet survivability not individual ship survivability is what dominates.
An area in which programmed fleets might have an advantage would be
when the long loiter time or deep reach of CTOL [conventional takeoff and
landing] aircraft on programmed big-deck CVNs [nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers] is needed.  That said, there need be no great sacrifice.  With airborne
tanking, the VSTOL [very short takeoff and landing] aircraft in the alternatives
could meet the deep strike and long loiter demands.  Also, as mentioned earlier,
a combination of advances in EMALS [electromagnetic aircraft launch system]
and modifications to the JSF will make it possible to launch the JSF with only
a marginal range-payload capability penalty.  Moreover, trends in technology are
providing unmanned aircraft greater capability, including greater loiter time and
sensor capability.61
CSBA Report.  The CSBA report argues that its architecture would provide
a total capability equal to that of the Navy’s planned architecture, but at a lower total
cost, because the CSBA architecture would:
! employ new ship designs, such the new undersea superiority system
and the SCX, that, because of their newer technologies, would cost
less than, but be equal in capability to, current designs such as the
Virginia-class SSN and DDG-1000 destroyer; and
! make more use of the LPD-17 hull design, whose basic design costs
have already been paid, and which can be produced efficiently in
large numbers and adapted economically to meet various mission
requirements.
It is plausible that using newer technologies would permit new, reduced-cost,
ship designs to be more capable than such designs would have been in the past.
Whether the increases in capability would always be enough to permit these ships to
be equal in capability to more expensive current designs is less clear.  The Navy may
be able to achieve this with a new SSN design, because several new submarine
technologies have emerged since the Virginia-class design was developed in the
1990s, but achieving this with a new large surface combatant design could be more
challenging, because the DDG-1000 design was developed within the last few years
and few new surface combatant technologies may have emerged since that time.  If
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62 On the topic of transitioning to the proposed fleet architecture, the report states:
Implementation of the alternative fleet architecture should start now and
should target option generation, short construction time, and technology
insertion. The alternative further provides an opportunity to reinvigorate the
shipbuilding industrial base. The many smaller ships, manned and unmanned, in
the alternative fleet architecture could be built in more shipyards and would be
relevant to overseas markets. The potential longevity of the existing fleet will
sustain existing shipyards as they move into building smaller ships more rapidly
in this broader market and more competitive environment. The shipyards would
develop a competence, broad relevance, and operate in an environment driven by
market imperatives instead of a framework of laws that frustrates market forces.
As the new ships enter service and the fleet has the opportunity to
experiment with new operational concepts (expanded network-centric warfare
in particular) existing ships can be retired sooner to capture operations savings.
At this point, the sooner the existing fleet is retired, the sooner the benefits of the
alternative fleet architecture design will accrue.  (Page 3)
(continued...)
one or more of the reduced-cost designs turn out to be less capable than current
designs, then the CSBA architecture would not generate as much total capability as
the report projects.
The CSBA report also argues that its architecture would produce a force with
a mix of capabilities that would better fit future strategic demands.  To achieve this,
the report recommends, among other things, reducing currently planned near-term
procurement of new destroyers and MPF(F) ships, increasing currently planned
procurement of new amphibious ships, and a changing the currently planned
investment mix for aircraft carriers.
Readers who agree with CSBA’s description of future strategic demands, and
who agree that CSBA’s recommended investment changes respond to those demands,
might conclude that the CSBA-recommended architecture would be better optimized
than the Navy’s planned architecture to meet future needs.  Readers who disagree
with one or both of these propositions might conclude that the Navy’s planned
architecture might be better optimized, or that neither architecture offers clear
advantages in this regard.
Implementation Risks.
CNA Report.  Implementation risks associated with the force recommended
in the CNA report include developing and designing the various types of ships
included in the plan — including in particular the DDG-1000 destroyer, which is to
incorporate a number of new technologies — and the issue of whether Navy funding
levels in coming years would be adequate to build and maintain the recommended
fleet.
OFT Report.  The OFT report does not include a detailed plan for transitioning
from today’s fleet architecture to its proposed architecture,62 but such a plan could be
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Additional general discussion of implementation is found on pp. 76-77 of the report.
developed as a follow-on analysis.  The plan could involve replacing existing ship
designs and associated formations as they retire with OFT’s recommended new ship
designs and associated formations.  Implementation risks associated with the force
recommended in the OFT report include developing and designing the eight new
types of ships included in the plan, including the four types of large ships based on
the 57,000-ton commercial-like hull, the 13,500-ton SES/catamaran aircraft carrier
(since it would be much larger than other SES/catamaran ships), the AIP submarine
(since the AIP technology is relatively new and a non-nuclear-powered submarine
has not been designed and built for the U.S. Navy since the 1950s), and the 1,000-
and 100-ton surface combatants (since new technologies are needed to achieve the
increased payload fraction that these ships are to have).  The OFT-recommended
force could pose implementation risks due to the new kinds of naval formations that
would be used, which could require development of new doctrine, concepts of
operations, and tactics.
CSBA Report.  A stated goal of the CSBA report is to provide a detailed,
practical transition road map for shifting from today’s fleet structure to the report’s
recommended fleet structure.  The many specific recommendations made in the
report could be viewed as forming such a road map.  Implementation risks associated
with the force recommended in the CSBA report include developing and designing
the reduced-cost SSN and the reduced-cost SCX surface combatant, particularly since
these two new ship designs are be equal in capability to the more expensive designs
they would replace.
Implications For Industrial Base.
CNA Report.  Since the CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships
and naval formations as those in use today or planned by the Navy, and recommends
similar numbers of ships, the industrial-base implications of the CNA-recommended
force would appear to be similar to those of the Navy’s current plans.
OFT Report.  The OFT report seeks to reduce unit shipbuilding costs, and
thereby permit an increase in total ship numbers, by shifting the fleet away from
complex, highly integrated ship designs that are inherently expensive to build and
toward less-complex merchant-like hulls and small sea frames that are inherently less
expensive to build.  Similarly, the OFT report seeks to increase shipbuilding options
for the Navy by shifting the fleet away from complex, highly integrated ship designs
that can be built only by a limited number of U.S. shipyards and toward less-complex
merchant-like hulls and small sea frames that can be built by a broader array of
shipyards.  The OFT report also aims to make it easier and less expensive to
modernize ships over their long lives, and thereby take better advantage of rapid
developments in technology, by shifting from highly integrated ship designs to
merchant-like hulls and sea frames.
As a consequence of these objectives, the OFT report poses a significant
potential business challenge to the six shipyards that have built the Navy’s major
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warships in recent years.  The report’s discussion on implementing its proposed
architecture states in part:
The shipbuilding industrial base would also need to start to retool to build
different types of ships more rapidly.  Smaller shipyards, which presently do
little or no work for the Navy could compete to build the smaller ships, thereby
broadening the capabilities base of ship design and construction available to the
Navy.  The change to smaller, lower unit cost ships would also open up overseas
markets. With more shipyards able to build the ships and potential for a broader
overall market, the U.S. shipbuilding industry would have the chance to expand
its competence, innovation and relevance.  Taken together this would sharpen the
industry’s ability to compete and provide alternatives to a ship procurement
system that is beset by laws and regulations that frustrate, even pervert, market
forces.63
The report’s concluding section lists five “dangers” that “risk the Navy’s ‘losing
the way.’”  One of these, the report states, is “Shielding the shipbuilding industrial
base from global competition,” which the report states “guarantees high cost, limited
innovation, and long cycle times for building ships.”64
CSBA Report.  The CSBA report similarly raises significant potential issues
for the six shipyards that have built the Navy’s major warships in recent years.  The
report states that “Rationalizing the defense industrial base is... a critical part of
DoN’s [the Department of the Navy’s] maritime competition strategy, and should be
the subject of immediate consideration and deliberation by the Congress, DoD, and
the DoN.”65  The report states: 
Numerous studies have indicated that the six Tier I yards [i.e., the six yards that
have built the Navy’s major warships in recent years] have “exorbitant excess
capacities,” which contribute to the rising costs of [Navy] warships, primarily
because of high industrial overhead costs.  These capacities are the result of
“cabotage laws and fluctuating national security acquisition policies that force
shipbuilders of combatants to retain capacities to address required surges in
coming years.”  This last point is especially important: the DoN contributes
greatly to the problem of “exorbitant capacities” by its consistent tendency to
portray overly optimistic ramp ups in ship production in budget “out years.”66
The report recommends the following as part of its overall transition strategy:
! Minimize production costs for more expensive warships (defined in
the report as ships costing more than $1.4 billion each) by
consolidating production of each kind of such ship in a single
shipyard, pursuing learning curve efficiencies, and requesting use of
multiyear procurement (MYP) whenever possible.
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67 CSBA report, slide 316.  Other steps recommended as part of the report’s overall
transition strategy (see slides 124 and 125) include the following:
! Plan to a fiscally prudent steady-state shipbuilding budget of $10 billion
per year.
! Maximize current capabilities and minimize nonrecurring engineering
costs for new platforms by maintaining and pursuing hulls in service, in
production or near production that can meet near- to mid-term GWOT
requirements and that are capable of operating in defended-access
scenarios against nuclear-armed regional adversaries.
! Identify and retain or build large numbers of common hulls that have a
large amount of internal reconfigurable volume, or that can carry a variety
of modular payloads, or that can be easily modified or adapted over time
to new missions.
! Pursue increased integration of Navy and Marine warfighting capabilities
and emphasize common systems to increase operational effectiveness and
reduce operation and support (O&S) costs.
! Focus research and development efforts on meeting future disruptive
maritime challenges, particularly anti-access/area-denial networks
composed of long-range systems and possibly weapons of mass
destruction.
68 CSBA report, slides 317-318. 
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! Minimize production costs for warships and auxiliaries costing less
than $1.4 billion each by emphasizing competition, shifting
production to smaller “Tier II” yards, using large production runs,
and enforcing ruthless cost control.67
The report states that “the strategy developed in this report suggests that [Navy]
planners might wish to:”
! maintain production of aircraft carriers at NGNN,
! consolidate production of large surface combatants and amphibious
ships at NG/Ingalls, and
! consolidate submarine building GD/EB, or with a new, single
submarine production company.68
The report states that the second of these possibilities is guided by the building
sequence of LPD-17s and SCXs recommended in the report, NG/Ingalls’ ability to
build a wider variety of ships than GD/BIW, NG/Ingalls’ surge capacity, and the
availability of space for expanding NG/Ingalls if needed.69
The report states that the third of these possibilities is guided by the low
probability that procurement of Virginia-class submarines will increase to two per
year, the cost savings associated with consolidating submarine production at one
yard, GD/EB’s past experience in building SSBNs and SSNs, GD/EB’s surge
capacity, and the fact that building submarines at GD/EB would maintain two
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shipyards (GD/EB and NGNN) capable of designing and building nuclear-powered
combatants of some kind.70
The report acknowledges that yard consolidation would reduce the possibilities
for using competition in shipbuilding in the near term and increase risks associated
with an attack on the shipbuilding infrastructure, but notes that DOD consolidated
construction of nuclear-powered carriers in a single yard years ago, and argues that
competition might be possible in the longer run if future aircraft-carrying ships, the
SCX, and the new undersea superiority system could be built in Tier II yards.71
The report states:
Given their current small yearly build numbers, consolidating construction of
aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and submarines in one yard [for each type]
makes sense.  However, the same logic does not hold true for auxiliaries and
smaller combatants.  These ships can normally be built at a variety of Tier I and
Tier II yards; competition can thus be maintained in a reasonable and cost-
effective way.  For example, competing auxiliaries and sea lift and maneuver sea
base ships between NASSCO, Avondale, and Tier II yards may help to keep the
costs of these ships down.
Building multiple classes of a single ship [type] is another prudent way to
enforce costs, since the DoN can divert production of any ship class that exceeds
its cost target to another company/class that does not.  Simultaneously building
both the [Lockheed] and [General Dynamics] versions of [the] LCS, and the
Northrop Grumman National Security Cutter, Medium [i.e., the medium-sized
Deepwater cutter] gives the DoN enduring capability to shift production to
whatever ship stays within its cost target....
Of course, Congress and the DoN may elect to retain industrial capacity, and to
pay the additional “insurance premium” associated with having excess
shipbuilding capacity.  For example: Congress and the DoN might wish to retain
two submarine yards until the [undersea superiority system] design is clear, and
wait to rationalize the submarine building base after potential [undersea
superiority system] yearly production rates are clear....
In a similar vein, Congress and the DoN might wish to retain two surface
combatant yards until the design of the SCX is clear, and wait to rationalize the
surface combatant building base after potential SCX yearly production rates are
clear.  In this regard, Congress could consider authorizing a modest additional
number of [Aegis destroyers] to keep both BIW and Ingalls “hot” until the SCX
is designed....
The key point is that the US shipbuilding infrastructure must be rationally sized
for expected future austere shipbuilding budgets, and whatever fiscally prudent
[Navy] transition plan is finally developed by DoN planners.72
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Summary
In summary, the following can be said about the three reports:
! The CNA report presents a fairly traditional approach to naval force
planning in which capability requirements for warfighting and for
maintaining day-to-day naval forward deployments are calculated
and then integrated.  The CNA-recommended force parallels fairly
closely current Navy thinking on the size and composition of the
fleet.  This is perhaps not surprising, given that much of CNA’s
analytical work is done at the Navy’s request.
! The OFT report fundamentally challenges current Navy thinking on
the size and composition of the fleet, and presents an essentially
clean-sheet proposal for a future Navy that would be radically
different from the currently planned fleet.  This is perhaps not
surprising, given both OFT’s institutional role within DOD as a
leading promoter of military transformation and retired admiral
Cebrowski’s views on network-centric warfare and distributed force
architectures.
! The CSBA report challenges current Navy thinking on the size and
composition of the fleet more dramatically than the CNA report, and
less dramatically than the OFT report.  Compared to the CNA and
OFT reports, the CSBA report contains a more detailed
implementation plan and a more detailed discussion of possibilities
for restructuring the shipbuilding industrial base.
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73 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated
that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987.  This figure, however, is
the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of
battle force ships.  The battle force ships figure is the number used in government
discussions of the size of the Navy.  In recent years, the total number of active ships has
been larger than the total number of battle force ships.  For example, the Naval Historical
Center states that as of Nov. 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while
the Navy states that as of Nov. 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships.
Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force
ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the
decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy.  As a general rule to avoid
potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time
should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.
Appendix C:  Size of Navy and Navy Shipbuilding
Rate
The total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak
of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.73  The Navy fell below
300 battle force ships in August 2003 and included 281 battle force ships as of
February 14, 2006.
Table 9 below shows past (FY1982-FY2006) and projected (FY2007-FY2011)
rates of Navy ship procurement.
Table 9. Battle Force Ships Procured (FY1982-FY2006) or
Projected (FY2007-FY2011)
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
17 14 16 19 20 17 15 19 15 11 11 7 4 4 5
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
4 5 5 6 6 6 5 7 8 6 7 7 11 12 14
Source:  CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation
committee and conference reports for each fiscal year.  The table excludes non-battle force ships that
do not count toward the 310- or 375- ship goal, such as sealift and prepositioning ships operated by
the Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
